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Abstract
Impaired self-awareness (ISA) of deficit has far-reaching and potentially catastrophic 
consequences to stroke survivors. Previous research suggests that self-awareness greatly 
depends on the context or nature of the task. One of the most potentially dangerous 
consequences of ISA manifests when stroke survivors attempt to resume driving 
prematurely. Despite these potential dangers, very little research has examined the 
manifestations of ISA and driving. The present study examined the self-awareness of 
driving simulator and neuropsychological performance among stroke patients, comparing 
them to healthy control participants. Thirty stroke survivors and 30 controls were each 
asked for prediction and postdiction ratings of their performance on various driving 
simulator and neuropsychological tasks. Self-estimates versus actual performance 
discrepancy scores were calculated for various simulator and neuropsychological 
measures. The results indicate that across all measures, the stroke survivors greatly 
overestimated their performance in comparison to the accuracy of self-evaluations among 
the controls, thus suggesting impaired self-awareness. This pattern of overestimating was 
observed on both novel (neuropsychological) and familiar (driving) tasks. However, there 
was some evidence to suggest that stroke survivors can benefit from feedback, as seen by 
increased accuracy in postdiction versus prediction self-evaluation scores. Additionally, 
both stroke survivors and controls showed greater shift toward accurate self-estimation on 
postdiction of driving performance than on postdiction of neuropsychological test 
performance. Although the temporal stability of the shift in awareness is not known, these 
results support the use of driving simulators as a useful and safe method of assessing and 
potentially improving stroke survivors’ ISA.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Stroke is the fourth leading cause of death in Canada; each year, between 40 000 
to 50 000 Canadians will suffer a stroke, resulting in approximately 16 000 deaths per 
year (Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, 2002). As a result of stroke, individuals 
may experience short-term and permanent impairments in many domains, including 
cognition, emotion, social interaction, and general behaviour. However, many stroke 
survivors experience significant limitations in their self-awareness of these deficits, a 
pattern that can greatly hinder their activities of daily living and independence, including 
driving. The purpose of this study is to examine stroke survivors’ self-awareness of 
driving ability as measured by the discrepancies between actual and estimated 
performance on a driving simulator task.
The probability of a stroke survivor returning to driving ranges from 30% to 75% 
(Mazer, Gelinas, & Benoit, 2004). In the event of driving cessation, stroke survivors 
experience a 42% decline in health-related quality of life (Poissant, Mayo, Wood- 
Dauphinee, & Clarke, 2004) which may be attributable to increased frequency of 
depression, less access to community activities, and limited ability to socialize (Mazer et 
al., 2004). Due to the large number of Canadians impacted by stroke and the potentially 
widespread consequences of driving cessation, accurate identification and effective 
retraining of driving abilities are of the utmost importance in this population. In order to 
do so one must understand the many facets of driving ability, how they are impacted by 
stroke, and the measures that can be implemented to help retrain individuals. Of these 
factors, one of the most important is self-awareness of deficit as it affects the implications 
of the distinct cognitive and physical disorders, as well as an individual’s approach to 
rehabilitation methods.
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In terms of driving resumption, there needs to be a balance between encouraging 
the return to functional independence and public safety. Although there are currently 
numerous avenues of assessment aimed at determining one’s fitness to drive, one of the 
primary factors remains the individual’s decision itself. In theory, the decision to return to 
driving is a complicated and multidimensional task that includes the ability to evaluate 
the demands of the task accurately in the context of one’s ability to manage those 
demands. This evaluative process must occur in cognitive, emotional, and physical 
domains and requires accurate self-evaluation. Unfortunately, following 
neuropsychological deficits, such as those following stroke, an individual’s self- 
evaluation of his/her functioning in these areas is often compromised (Prigatano & 
Klonoff, 1998). Therefore, it is important for clinicians to be aware of clients’ self- 
evaluation process and how it occurs in the context of driving resumption.
The present study will investigate self-evaluation of driving performance in stroke 
patients. This introduction will be divided into two primary chapters. The first chapter 
will discuss the construct of self-awareness, including a discussion of general theories, 
methods of measurement, and its relationship to different domains and skills. The second 
chapter will then turn to a description of the literature pertaining to stroke and driving 
ability. This chapter will contain a discussion of general theories of normal driving 
ability, the clinical manifestations of driving deficits in stroke patients, self-evaluation of 
driving abilities, and the recent use of driving simulators as a possible procedure for 
improving self-awareness in stroke patients.
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Impaired Self-Awareness 
Definition of ISA
ISA can have devastating effects on an individual’s ability to manage their 
environment effectively. In fact, self-awareness has been viewed as the highest form of 
brain activity that mediates and interacts with other brain processes (Stuss, 1991). In a 
clinical setting, ISA can result in lack of motivation to participate in rehabilitation, 
unwillingness to use assistive/compensatory devices, the decision to leave treatment 
prematurely, and poor choices regarding community integration. This can subsequently 
lead to vocational choices that exceed ability, which may result in safety risks and 
increased probability of long-term psychological problems. In fact, self-awareness has 
been identified as a powerful predictor of vocational success (Sherer, Bergloff et al.,
1998) and rehabilitation outcome (Sherer, Boake et al., 1998). A recent review of the 
literature pertaining to rehabilitation outcome following acquired brain injury revealed 
that 10 of 12 empirical studies indicated a strong positive correlation between self- 
awareness of deficit and rehabilitation outcome (Ownsworth & Clare, 2006). At the other 
end of the spectrum, self-awareness has been found to predict behavioural disturbance in 
acquired and traumatic brain injury independent of cognitive and executive function 
(Bach & David, 2006). Most relevant to the current study, self-awareness also plays an 
essential role in self-judgment regarding fitness to drive (Coleman et al., 2002; Scott et 
al., 2007).
Within research, a variety of terms have been used to describe ISA, including lack 
of insight, anosognosia, and neglect, as well as terms such as denial, eutonia, indifference, 
and metacognition. Unfortunately, the true definitions of these terms do not allow for 
interchangeable use. For instance, although both denial and anosognosia involve the
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denial of deficits, the underlying mechanisms are different (i.e., denial reflects a defense 
mechanism to alleviate emotional upset whereas anosognosia represents a lack of 
awareness likely caused by brain damage). Therefore, it is important to properly define 
the terminology and distinguish between concepts. The terms unawareness and 
anosognosia (literally meaning “without knowledge of disease”) are often used 
interchangeably in the literature (Hartmann-Maeir, Soroker, Oman, & Katz, 2003). 
Babinski (1914; as cited in Vuilleumier, 2004) first coined the term “anosognosia” to 
describe an individual’s lack of knowledge, awareness, or recognition of their physical 
disease. By definition, anosognosia occurs in “patients with neurological impairments 
who appear unable to notice and acknowledge the existence of deficits, often despite 
blatant evidence for the handicap (e.g., hemiplegia)” (Vuilleumier, 2004, p. 9). Self- 
awareness has been defined as “the capacity to perceive the ‘self in relatively ‘objective’ 
terms whilst maintaining a sense of subjectivity” (Prigatano, & Schacter, 1991, p. 13). It 
involves the “interaction between thoughts (i.e., knowledge of the situation in an 
objective sense) and feelings (i.e., appreciation or unique interpretation of situation in a 
subjective sense)” (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991, p. 13). Conversely, ISA reflects “an 
impairment in the patient’s ability to consciously represent (perceive and experience) a 
disturbance in higher cerebral functioning- a disruption in the integration of thinking and 
feeling” (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998, p. 57). For the purposes of this study, the terms 
anosognosia, unawareness of deficit, and ISA will be used interchangeably to 
communicate this concept.
In the context of stroke, ISA is noted most frequently in the most severe form: 
hemineglect. Hemineglect (particularly in terms of unawareness for hemiplegia) is also 
one of the most common manifestations of ISA in stroke populations as it occurs in 20 to
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30% of the stroke population (Vuilleumier, 2004). Initial studies on awareness after 
stroke addressed this striking phenomenon of unawareness of paralysis, particularly in 
right-hemisphere damage (Hartmann-Maeir, Soroker, Ring, & Katz, 2002). Since then, 
there has been some debate as to whether self-awareness of deficit shows consistent 
lateralization. Some researchers have shown that it occurs at higher rates in individuals 
who suffer right-sided strokes (Anderson & Tranel, 1989; Hartmann-Maeir et al., 2002) 
whereas others have failed to find a consistent lateralization pattern (Hartmann-Maeir et 
al, 2003; Hibbard, Gordon, Stein, Grober, & Sliwinski, 1992). Regardless of 
lateralization, ISA of deficit constitutes a significant problem in stroke patients, not only 
in terms of the severe forms such as hemineglect, but also in its more subtle aspects, for 
example, ignorance of cognitive, physical, and emotional deficits. In fact, the incidence of 
ISA in stroke populations has been reported to be as high as 39 to 50% (Hartmann-Maeir 
et al., 2002; Wagner & Cushman, 1989) and in one study, 30% of the sample did not 
spontaneously acknowledge having a stroke at all (Hartmann-Maeir et al., 2002).
Theories of ISA
Numerous theories have proposed possible mechanisms or factors involved in 
self-awareness. Fleming and Strong (1995) discussed three levels of self-awareness: 1) 
knowledge of deficits; 2) functional implications of the deficits; and 3) realistic 
expectations in predicting performance. Flashman and colleagues (Flashman, Amador, & 
McAllister, 1998) expanded upon this theory by proposing similar cognitive dimensions 
(i.e., knowledge of deficit and ability to comprehend impact of deficit on daily life) and 
by also including the emotional response to the deficit (i.e., anger, denial, apathy) as a 
critical dimension related to self-awareness. Similarly, Allen and Ruff (1990) 
distinguished between psychological and neuropsychological/cognitive factors among
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three levels of processing that they believed influenced the accuracy of a patient’s self- 
reporting. The first level, termed awareness, requires the ability to attend to, encode, and 
retrieve information in relation to one’s self; neuropsychological factors mostly affect this 
level. Appraisal, the second level, occurs when the patient compares information about 
the current self with premorbid self-evaluations, a process mediated by both emotional 
and cognitive functioning. Finally, disclosure is the willingness to report one’s self­
perception to another person or clinician, again a process mediated by both cognitive and 
emotional factors.
Many other potential mechanisms have been proposed since the inception of these 
general theories. There are emotional and motivational theories pertaining to inaccurate 
self-evaluation. ISA may involve a deficient affective drive that inhibits a person’s ability 
to respond to uncertainties about current bodily states or cognitive abilities or leads to 
lessened emotional impact of perceived or supposed failure (Vuilleumier, 2000). A 
patient with ISA may placidly accept only partial knowledge about his/her current state 
and fail to engage in verification processes that one would normally carry out when faced 
with novel or threatening challenges (Vuilleumier, 2004).
Conversely, there have also been hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
ISA and brain dysfunction, and other comorbid cognitive sequelae (Vuilleumier, 2000). 
Damage to subcortical circuits may lead to compromised self-monitoring processes and 
inability to modify one’s beliefs and behaviours based on novel experience (Vuilleumier, 
2000). General disorder theories of awareness deficits suggest there is an executive or 
supervising control function providing direction to other subordinate cognitive skills and 
therefore significant disruption of higher order cognition (e.g., monitoring, self­
regulation) may lead to deficits in self-awareness (Stuss, 1991).
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Recent research has begun to examine the relationship between self-awareness 
and other executive functions in neurological populations, including stroke. Although 
there seems to be a relationship between executive functioning and self-awareness, no 
specific neuropsychological profile is associated with ISA. Research has found that 
specific deficits in set-shifting and flexibility, processes usually associated with the 
frontal lobes, are more frequent in patients with ISA (Starkstein, Fedoroff, Price, 
Leiguarda et al., 1993). In some studies, scores on executive function tasks have shown 
stronger correlations with ISA than tests of other neuropsychological domains (Burgess, 
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). In contrast, other studies have shown 
measures of self-awareness to be unrelated to performance on other executive function 
tasks (Bogod, Mateer, & Macdonald, 2003). The discrepant findings regarding the 
relationship between executive functioning measures and self-awareness may stem from 
the fact that they are both very complicated and multifaceted constructs. Although most 
would agree that executive functioning comprises a vast array of distinct yet interacting 
abilities, self-awareness has been viewed mostly as a one-dimensional entity. Also, self- 
awareness has proven to be a difficult phenomenon to operationally define and measure 
given its complicated and intangible nature.
Measurement of ISA
The discrepancy between findings may result from how self-awareness is defined 
and measured. There has been a lack of uniform methodology in neuropsychological 
research examining this phenomenon. Approaches have used different definitions and 
measurements of awareness and hence given rise to different, and on occasion, divergent, 
awareness results (Markova & Berrios, 2006). Early research on this construct generally 
relied on clinical observation and rarely operationally defined unawareness of deficit with
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explicit criteria (Ergh, 2004). In general, there are three primary approaches to the 
measurement of self-awareness: the discrepancy between the patient’s report and others’ 
(e.g., significant other, therapist, doctor); the discrepancy between the patient’s 
description of his/her abilities and the actual abilities as measured by neuropsychological 
tests; and a metacognitive approach employing predicted performance experiments. Most 
often, self-awareness is measured by comparing the patient’s self-report on a 
questionnaire to that of their significant other or relatives. The primary advantage to this 
approach is that relatives often know the patient prior to the disability and spend a 
significant amount of time with the patient in a variety of settings, thus acting as a reliable 
informant (Ergh, 2004). However, although it is expected that the patient’s self-report 
may be inaccurate, the reliance on significant others’ reports as the “correct” 
determination of the patient’s actual functioning may also lead to biased results since they 
may lack objectivity and are usually emotionally invested in their significant other’s 
functioning.
In order to eliminate the potential bias resulting from others’ reports, another 
approach that has been implemented is the use of the discrepancy between the patient’s 
description of his/her abilities and the patient’s abilities as measured by 
neuropsychological tests. The primary advantage to this approach is that it includes an 
objective measure of the patient’s deficits by using standardized tests of neurocognitive 
performance that have normative bases. One of the most common measures used in this 
approach is the Awareness Interview (Anderson & Tranel, 1989), a structured interview 
of patients’ general descriptions of their abilities (e.g., memory, attention). Using this 
methodology, Anderson and Tranel discovered that neurological damage resulting from 
stroke, TBI, and dementia was frequently accompanied by some degree of unawareness
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of deficits. However, this approach relies on patients’ descriptions of broad domains (e.g, 
memory) whereas the neuropsychological tests tend to be highly specific and novel. As 
such, it becomes hard to determine whether the patient is reporting on the same ability 
that is being measured by the neuropsychological test (Trosset & Kaszniak, 1996).
A more reliable and valid evaluation of self-awareness would involve the 
comparison of the patient’s self-rating of a particular domain to their actual test 
performance within that domain. This approach borrows from the metacognition literature 
(i.e., knowing about one’s own cognitions) and implements predicted performance 
experiments (Ergh, 2004; McGlynn & Kaszniak, 1991; Trosset & Kaszniak, 1996). 
Patients predict their performance on specific cognitive tasks and awareness is measured 
as the discrepancy between predicted and actual performance, thus allowing for a direct 
comparison because the quantities are measured on the same scale (Trosset & Kaszniak, 
1996). Trosset and Kaszniak (1996) introduced the basic analysis for using predicted 
performance experiments. Their first experiment involved examining the discrepancy 
between a patient’s predicted performance (ppp) and a patient’s actual performance (pap) 
on a particular task using raw scores for the estimations. In following experiments, they 
also asked patients to predict their caregiver’s cognitive performance (ppc) in order to 
delineate whether an overall impairment in judgement was underlying the problem. 
Finally, as a means of controlling whether overprediction of personal abilities was 
disease-specific or just a general human tendency, Trosset and Kaszniak asked the 
healthy caregivers to predict his/her own performance (cpc) as well as the patient’s 
performance (cpp) while also measuring the caregiver’s actual performance (cap). From 
these experiments, the researchers developed a final equation entitled the “Comparative 
Prediction Accuracy” (CPA) which was calculated as:
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CPA = (ppp/nan V (ppc/can)
(cpc/cap)/(cpp/pap)
Although this approach served as a foundation for future research, there were 
several methodological limitations inherent in its design. First, this approach is limited by 
its reliance on a person’s ability to predict their performance on a task with which they 
are unfamiliar (Trosset & Kaszniak, 1996). Patients are typically asked to predict their 
performance following task instructions; however they may still find it hard to ascertain 
the cognitive functions tapped by the tasks. Failure to assess the cognitive abilities 
underlying the tasks may hinder accurate predictions. This may be partially remedied by 
obtaining post-task estimations from the patient, who at that time will have a better idea 
of what the task involved and how he/she performed. This approach also allows for an 
evaluation of how well a patient is able to respond to feedback.
Using this approach, Marcel, Tegner, and Nimmo-Smith (2004) conducted one of 
the strongest evaluations of the relationship between self-awareness and executive 
functioning. They examined stroke patients’ ability to evaluate flexibly their performance 
on traditional tests of executive functioning (e.g., sorting tasks, verbal fluency) based on 
their pre-test expectations and actual test outcomes. Patients’ predictions of task 
performance were compared to the patients’ actual performance. Overall, stroke patients 
displayed a significant overestimation of their performance and the proportion of 
overestimation increased as severity of executive dysfunction increased. Following that, 
the researchers asked patients to re-evaluate their performance after the task. A  
hemispheric difference was observed as those individuals with left-sided injuries made a 
significant adjustment in their estimates whereas those with right-sided injuries showed 
minimal adjustment. These results were consistent with the general consensus that
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awareness deficits occur predominantly in right-hemisphere injuries (Ownsworth, 
McFarland, & Young, 2002). From these findings, the authors concluded that accurate 
awareness of deficit requires some form of calibration based on direct personal 
experience with the deficit and a special type of mental flexibility needed to adjust 
behaviour based on that experience. As such, they suggested that when possible, post-task 
estimations should also be used to obtain a more reliable index of self-awareness.
Second, this methodology involved the use of raw scores for estimation. Raw 
scores are meaningless by themselves and need to be placed in the context of normative 
expectations, particularly for patients who are unfamiliar with the task at hand (Ergh, 
2004). Raw scores provide no anchor for which a person to accurately judge their 
performance in comparison to the normative sample, or against the “average person”, nor 
do they include the relative impairment ranges that correspond to test performance. For 
example, if a patient is asked to predict how many items they will remember on a 20-item 
recognition memory test, they may estimate 15 assuming that it equates to an above- 
average performance (75% accuracy). In reality, this raw score would be indicative of 
impaired performance when using normative comparison data. Thus, asking patients for 
raw score equivalents most likely introduces more ambiguity to the measurement of 
unawareness of deficit.
Ergh (2004) developed an alternative measurement technique to eliminate the 
reliance on raw scores and their inherent ambiguity and pilot a model of metacognitive 
awareness of cognitive deficit for use in various populations. In the preliminary study, 
individuals with multiple sclerosis (MS) were asked to rate their performance compared 
to others their age. Instead of asking for raw scores, participants were provided choices 
that could be scaled to T-score equivalents with clear interpretive markings (e.g.,
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extremely worse than other healthy people your age, much worse, worse, the same, better, 
much better, and extremely better)(Ergh, 2004). They were then asked to estimate their 
performance on the test based on the given performance ranges (patient’s predicted T- 
score performance: pptp). The participant’s neuropsychological performance was also 
converted to a T score based on normative data (patient’s actual T-score performance: 
patp). By using this method, the difference score obtained was anchored in standard units. 
The researcher then divided the discrepancy score by a measure of dispersion (normative 
T-score standard deviation of 10) to anchor the result in standard deviation units, similar 
to a z score. Thus, the result of 1.0 was translated to the person overestimating his/her 
performance by 1 standard deviation (i.e., 10 T-score points). Thus, Ergh proposed and 
implemented “Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores” as the measure of awareness:
p a tp - pptp 
10
Ergh utilized this equation for both pre- and post-test predictions. Positive scores 
represented unawareness of cognitive deficits, whereas negative scores represented 
hyperawareness (i.e., participants estimated that they performed worse than they actually 
did). Using this method, the findings showed that approximately one third of the MS 
sample demonstrated diminished awareness of their cognitive and/or functional deficits. 
ISA Across Domains
Common sense suggests that ISA occurs across a wide variety of domains, 
including emotional, physical, cognitive, and behavioural ones. Despite this, only a small 
number of studies have directly compared the nature of self-awareness in different 
contexts or domains and the results of these studies have been contradictory. Prigatano, 
Altman, and O’Brien (1990) found that individuals who had suffered a traumatic brain
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injury showed differing levels of self-awareness across various domains. In comparison to 
the reports of others regarding various activities of daily living, patients overestimated 
their abilities in non-physical areas (i.e., social interaction, emotional control, cognition) 
whereas their evaluations of their physical capabilities and self-care were more accurate. 
Conversely, in a study examining 87 stroke patients, the largest discrepancy between 
patients’ reports and those of their significant others occurred in the evaluation of motor 
activities. On cognitive and emotional aspects, patients actually rated themselves as more 
impaired than significant others did (Gauggel, Peleska, & Bode, 2000).
Anderson and Tranel (1989) examined ISA of cognitive and motor deficits among 
stroke patients. A self-report measure of awareness was administered to patients 3 to 25 
days post stroke. Whereas 28% of the patients were unaware of their motor deficits, 72% 
of the sample showed impaired awareness for cognitive deficits. Specifically, less than 
one-third of patients were accurate about their abstracting abilities and 50% showed 
impaired awareness of their memory and language functioning.
Fischer, Trexler, and Gauggel (2004) combined a self-report method with the 
predicted performance method of self-awareness to examine possible domain differences. 
Patients in two groups, a mixed neurological sample [traumatic brain injury (TBI) and 
cerebrovascular accident (CVA)] and orthopaedic controls, were asked to complete test of 
simple motor ability (finger tapping) and cognition (list learning). There was no over­
prediction of performance on simple motor tasks in any of the groups. There was a 
discrepancy, however, between the TBI and CVA patients in both awareness measures. 
Whereas the TBI group showed over-estimation in the self-report and list learning task, 
the CVA group only showed an over-estimation in the list learning task, and to a lesser 
extent than the TBI group. The authors used these results as the basis for warning against
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the assumption that some self-report measures that were designed initially for bilateral or 
diffuse injuries (i.e., TBI) would reflect self-awareness deficits observed in asymmetric or 
unilateral injuries, such as unilateral CVA. Instead, the authors suggested the use of the 
predicted performance method in CVA populations.
From these findings, it appears that self-awareness in stroke patients differs as a 
function of the context involved. Self-awareness for novel versus familiar tasks has not 
been examined. As Marcel’s theory stated, self-awareness requires some form of 
calibration based on personal experience (Marcel et al., 2004) and an individual’s ability 
to adjust behaviour based on this experience. As such, it is possible that self-awareness 
following stroke may differ depending on the amount of experience one has had with the 
task prior to injury; that is the degree of familiarity or habituation. Thus, individuals may 
show less accurate self-appraisals of activities they believe are well-learned or familiar, 
such as driving.
Driving After Stroke 
Models of Driving Ability
Many models of driving have been proposed in attempts to describe, classify, and 
simplify its multidimensional nature. These models have contributed to the understanding 
of driving by elucidating the components of normal driving as well as aiding the 
determination of risk factors for unsafe driving. Models differ in their focus. Some 
primarily describe emotional and motivational factors, others look only at cognitive 
abilities, and, more recently, some have begun to describe the interaction of these 
variables. Within neuropsychological research, however, most emphasis has been placed 
on the cognitive and interactive models.
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Early in the driving literature, research focused on what were considered the basic 
elements of driving performance. Specifically, there was an erroneous belief that 
psychomotor abilities such as visual scanning, reaction time, along with knowledge of 
driving regulations, interact to form a hypothetical construct of “driving skill”. The more 
driving skill an individual had, the better driver they would be. Hopewell (2002) proposed 
that this was related to what he termed the “rehabilitation myth” (p. 52) that is, the better 
professionals trained a neurologically impaired driver, the more “driving skill” they 
would recover, a concept analogous to exercising muscles to regain physical strength and 
endurance. Hopewell stated that although such skills are necessary for successful driving, 
they were by no means sufficient for safe driving. Instead, he theorized that these skills 
were actually less predictive of driving risk than cognitive, executive, and personality 
functions.
Michon (1985) proposed a theory of driving behaviour that included both basic 
and higher order processes. He proposed three levels of decision-making involved in safe 
driving rather than focusing on basic elements of driving performance. The strategic level 
involved decisions concerning the planning of safe driving with regard to time and route. 
This level was not time-dependent and could take place both in and out of the car. 
Cognitively, functioning at this level was mostly memory and reasoning driven and 
would therefore become impaired by deficits in memory, executive functioning, or 
reasoning (Mazer et al., 2004). Michon’s second level involved decisions regarding the 
basic manoeuvring and negotiation of common driving situations, decisions, and actions 
and was termed the tactical level. At this stage, individuals were required to make correct 
judgements of traffic situations and partake in anticipatory risk avoidance behaviours. 
Decisions were somewhat time-dependent and data driven by one’s immediate driving
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environment. As such, performance at this level required cognitive control and flexibility, 
awareness of traffic demands and allocating attention appropriately. Finally, the 
operational level involved actual vehicle control inputs and comprised largely 
automatized action patterns, immediate time reactions, and perceptual speed. Michon 
described this level as the most basic of the three and involving what was previously 
termed “driving skill.”
Since the inception of Michon’s model, much research has examined performance 
among these levels in both neurologically intact and impaired populations. Despite 
Michon’s proposal stating that each of the three levels was equally important, most 
neuropsychological researchers and clinical practitioners have continued to focus 
primarily on the operational level (i.e., “driving skill” elements), and to a lesser extent, 
the tactical level, whereas higher order executive functioning and reasoning involved in 
actual driving behaviour have been left relatively unexamined. The unequal focus on 
operational tasks may result from the nature of the neuropsychological tests themselves. 
Basic cognitive skills (e.g., reaction time) are easier to separate and evaluate than more 
complex and multifaceted constructs such as executive functioning and reasoning. 
However, given the equal importance that Michon placed on higher order and strategic 
decision making, compared with the other two levels, examination of these variables 
would surely provide important information about the elucidation and prediction of 
driving behaviours.
Whereas Michon’s model of driving focused on the components of safe driving, 
Galski and colleagues (Galski, Bruno, & Ehle, 1992) proposed a Cybernetic model 
designed to diagnose the cause of driving problems. The authors delineated between what 
they termed “general” and “specific” driving programs. The general driving program
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consisted of the executive skills needed for driving, including complex information 
processing that serves as a mechanism that initiates and directs all driving-related 
activities. It also included dynamic memory, which was described as an expert system 
required to apply road knowledge in routine situations yet also maintain the capacity to 
adopt to new situations with the use of available information. With brain damage, 
individuals were hypothesized to lose some or all of their dynamic memory which could 
be seen in their incapacity to build upon driving experience or to apply learned 
information. The specific driving program was considered a volitional process that sets 
and implements particular driving plans once the general program determines the most 
effective approach.
The Cybernetic model also includes four additional systems according to Galski 
and colleagues (1992). The first two of these systems consist of the basic sensory input 
and motor output encountered in the driving environment. The third system serves to 
calculate, integrate, and coordinate sensory information by mechanisms such as efficient 
visual scanning and selective attention. It is referred to as the calculation and construction 
co-processor. Finally, Galski and colleagues describe the “resident diagnostic program” 
the most complex of the four additional systems. This system’s primary purpose is to act 
as a warning mechanism to the driver about potential dangers to the rest of the system. To 
do so, this system requires intact cognitive reasoning, executive functioning, and 
psychological factors.
As both Michon and the Cybernetic model suggest, driving is a complex and 
multifaceted task that is hindered by deficits at various levels, from basic reaction time 
and sensory input to complex executive functioning and reasoning. The strong theoretical 
foundation put forth by these researchers is, therefore, particularly important in research
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examining driving in neurologically impaired populations. However, despite their 
emphasis on higher-order and executive functioning, research has only recently begun to 
fully investigate the various processes involved in driving in these populations. 
Examination of these variables is particularly important in populations known to 
demonstrate various deficits in executive functioning, such as individuals with stroke. 
Driving Ability Following Stroke
Many factors contribute to an individual’s decision to resume driving duties 
following stroke, including the opinion of the clinician, need or desire to drive again, as 
well as the cognitive and physical limitations following stroke and the degree to which 
the individual perceives these restrictions to performance. Clearly, some sequelae of 
stroke, such as visual field deficits (e.g., homonymous hemianopia), epileptic seizures, 
neglect, and apraxia, strongly contradict driving resumption. The relationship between 
cognitive impairment and driving safety tends to follow an “inverted-U” distribution of 
risk versus injury severity. Those with very severe strokes will be less likely to return to 
driving as their level of physical and cognitive functioning clearly prevents independent 
functioning during even basic activities of daily living. Thus, they pose little driving risk. 
On the other end of the spectrum, individuals with very mild strokes will most likely 
exhibit very few, if any, residual deficits and will therefore show no more safety risk than 
the average driver. The individuals whose stroke severity falls between the very mild and 
very profound, however, are those who necessitate fitness to drive assessments and 
driving rehabilitation as they pose the greatest risks to themselves and others if  they 
attempt to return to driving prematurely.
There is much debate as to whether stroke survivors pose an exaggerated safety 
risk on the road. Some studies suggest that stroke survivors show no increased risk for
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accidents or citations compared to normal controls (Haselkom, Mueller, & Rivara, 1998; 
Katz et al., 1990) whereas others have found a history of stroke or transient ischemic 
attacks (TIA) to be significantly associated with accidents five years post-injury (Sims, 
McGwin, Allman, Ball, & Owsley, 2000). Similarly, others have argued that a strong 
relationship exists between stroke and driving risk but this relationship is masked by the 
fact that stroke is strongly correlated with decreased average mileage (Lyman, McGwin 
Jr., & Sims, 2001). In a review of the literature, van Zomeren and colleagues concluded 
“brain-damaged drivers could not, in general, be seen as risky drivers, although some 
individuals show decreased driving skill and risky behavior in traffic” (van Zomeren, 
Brouwer, & Minderhoud, 1987, p. 697). These studies differed in their evaluation of 
“safe” driving behaviour (e.g., number of traffic citations, self-report). These variations 
may contribute to the debate over stroke patients’ driving safety. Therefore, a valid and 
comprehensive method of identifying stroke patients who are unsafe to resume driving is 
beneficial, if not necessary.
Neuropsychological assessment has been demonstrated to be helpful in the 
identification of unsafe driving performance because it examines the many facets of both 
stroke and driving ability, including cognitive, emotional, and behavioural functioning. 
Hopewell and van Zomeren (1990) proposed that five major factors account for most of 
the variance in driving skill and driving risk: driving and accident/violation history, 
general personality and attitudinal factors, pattern and severity of alcohol/substance 
abuse, nature and extent o f psychiatric and executive disturbance, and basic psychomotor 
abilities. Therefore, neuropsychological assessment is helpful in this setting as it allows 
for the evaluation of psychiatric, executive, and psychomotor abilities, all of which are 
known to be potentially affected by stroke.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Self-Evaluation of Driving Simulator 20
Although basic sensory-perceptual functions are frequently compromised after 
stroke, the presence of such impairment does not necessarily hinder driving ability. For 
example, peripheral vision and contrast sensitivity were found to be impaired in 
comparison to healthy controls in stroke survivors but impairments in peripheral vision or 
visual acuity did not distinguish between stroke survivors who did and did not resume 
driving (Fisk, Owsley, & Mennemeier, 2002). Similarly, Nouri and colleagues found that 
the results of tests of vision and visual fields were not related to driving performance 
(Nouri, Tinson, & Lincoln, 1987).
More complex visual abilities, however, such as visual scanning, as well as 
selective and divided attention, have been found to be related to driving performance in 
stroke patients. Specifically, the Useful Field of View (UFOV) test (Ball & Owsley,
1992) has been found to be one of the neuropsychological tests most predictive of driving 
performance. The test augments the assessment of simple peripheral vision by increasing 
the functional visual capacity under conditions of increasing cognitive load, thus 
requiring intact divided attention, visual search, and scanning. Myers and others (Myers, 
Bal, Kalina, Roth, & Goode, 2000) found that the UFOV test alone showed 86% accuracy 
in predicting outcome of on-road driving evaluations. This finding is consistent with other 
studies that revealed the UFOV to be strongly related to driving ability in both normal 
aging populations and stroke (Fisk et al., 2002; Whelihan, DiCarlo, & Paul, 2005). In 
fact, it has been proposed that the UFOV, or other measures of brief, vision-based 
complex attention measures always be used in fitness to drive assessments (Bieliauskas, 
2005). The UFOV has also been used as a rehabilitation mechanism for driving retraining 
and found to result in a two-fold increase in rate of success on on-road driving 
evaluations (Mazer et al., 2003).
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Other basic neuropsychological abilities, such as reaction time and processing 
speed, are consistently impaired in stroke patients when compared to matched controls 
(e.g., Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000; Sundet, Goffeng, & Hofft, 1995) but their 
ability to predict driving performance remains unclear. Whereas simple reaction time has 
been cited as a significant predictor of driving performance in some studies (e.g., 
Lundqvist, Gerdle, & Ronnberg, 2000; Schanke & Sundet, 2000), others have failed to 
find a significant relationship between the two (Nouri et al., 1987). Most likely these 
inconsistencies arise from the nature of the reaction time measures themselves, as some 
utilize simple reaction time and others use complex choice reaction time tasks.
Among pre-driving neuropsychological assessments, slowed information 
processing speed is mentioned consistently as one of the strongest predictors of poor on­
road performance (Engum, Cron, Hulse, Pendergrass, & Lambert, 1988; Gouvier et al., 
1989; Schanke & Sundet, 2000; Sundet et al., 1995). Although the types of measures used 
to assess processing speed differ, one of the most effective is the Symbol Digit Modalities 
Test (SDMT; Smith, 1991). Gouvier and colleagues (1989) showed that the oral version 
of the SDMT accounted for 70% of the variance in an on-road driving score. Since then, 
the SDMT remains one of the most consistently impaired neuropsychological tests in 
individuals who are considered not fit to drive (Schanke & Sundet, 2000).
From these results, there appears to be a general trend: as the cognitive demand of 
a task increases, so does that task’s relationship with driving performance. Accordingly, it 
is not surprising that higher order executive functions are, almost without exception, the 
strongest predictors of on-road driving performance. Many studies have listed specific 
executive functions as significant predictors of future driving success, including response 
disinhibition and impulsivity (Engum et al., 1988; Hopewell, 2002; Schanke & Sundet,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Self-Evaluation of Driving Simulator 22
2000), impaired problem solving and complex reasoning (Nouri et al., 1987; Nouri & 
Lincoln, 1992), planning and organization (Galski, Bruno, & Ehle, 1992), and overall 
poor judgment (Engum et al., 1988). Cognitive flexibility, often measured by the Trail 
Making Test-B, is one of the executive functions most often cited as a strong predictor of 
driving ability (Hopewell, 2002; Schanke & Sundet, 2000). In one study, stroke patients 
who performed poorly on both the TMT-B and a visual-perception test were 22 times 
more likely to fail an on-road driving evaluation (Mazer, Komer-Bitensky, & Sofer,
1998). Similarly, using a discriminant function analysis, Sundet and others (1995) found 
that the TMT-B (specifically a cutoff score greater than 180 seconds) was the single most 
potent variable in the classification of driving status post-stroke.
The results of these neuropsychological studies lead to two conclusions. First, 
those who have criticized current driving training programs for focusing too much on 
driving skills at the operational level (i.e., handling the car) are supported by 
neuropsychological research that has suggested that emphasis should instead be placed on 
higher order cognitive skills at the tactical or strategic level. Second, although the pre­
driving neuropsychological battery is useful in predicting on-road performance (e.g., 
TMT-B, SDMT, UFOV) there is still much variance left unaccounted for in stroke 
patients. This suggests that some aspects of driving behaviour remain unexamined or that 
there exist mediating variables affecting the relationship between neuropsychological 
functioning and driving performance. Self-awareness may be one such variable. 
Self-Evaluation of Driving Ability in Stroke
Success of driving interventions and return to the road following stroke depend on 
the ability of drivers at risk to recognize problems so they are willing to undergo 
interventions. Self-awareness acts as a critical moderating variable in the relationship
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between stroke and driving safety. Individuals with intact self-awareness, regardless of 
extent of neurocognitive and physical limitations, are less likely to act unsafely. 
Individuals with intact self-awareness may compensate for residual impairments by 
strategically limiting their exposure to risky situations (e.g., driving at night, heavy 
traffic) or may cease driving completely as a successful mechanism for managing risk 
(Coleman, Rapport, & Hanks, 2004). Overall, some studies suggest that stroke survivors 
are capable of making accurate judgements about their driving ability (Golper, Rau, & 
Marshall, 1980) although others report the opposite (Hartje, Willmes, Pach, Hannen, & 
Weber, 1991). Recently, Rapport and colleagues found individuals’ perceptions of 
barriers to driving provided unique information in the prediction of objective and 
subjective indices of community integration even after accounting for other potentially 
important variables like injury severity (Rapport, Hanks, & Bryer, 2006). Futhermore, 
Scott and colleagues (Scott et al., 2007) reported that stroke survivors’ endorsement of 
only convenience/ease (while disregarding professional advice and physical functioning) 
as an important consideration in the decision to resume driving may reflect unawareness 
of their deficits and the high importance they place on the ability to drive and the 
independence it affords them.
Self-awareness for driving ability may be compromised in stroke populations 
because of several factors. First, studies of normal drivers’ attitudes towards their safety 
and skill have revealed a seemingly universal phenomenon of self-enhancement bias in 
that between 60% to 90% of people claim to be better than the average driver 
(Delhomme, 1991). It has been shown consistently that regardless of age, gender, or 
actual driving record, drivers rate their own driving ability as being better than that of 
their peers and they estimate their risk for accidents as lower than the average driver
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(Finn & Bragg, 1986; Groeger & Brown, 1989; Matthews & Moran, 1986; Svenson,
1981). Second, based on the aforementioned literature, stroke survivors demonstrate 
impaired levels of self-awareness in a variety of domains over and above the self­
enhancement bias seen in normals. Third, stroke patients often over-estimate their 
abilities in novel cognitive tasks; thus, it could be hypothesized that this tendency toward 
over-estimation will be exacerbated in a context (i.e., driving) within which individuals 
feel more confident in their ability and have been found to be susceptible to general self­
enhancing biases.
Finally, previous researchers have suggested that ISA is most likely to occur when 
the motivation to self-deceive is high and there is a lack of concrete evidence or 
information available by which to self-evaluate (Flashman & McAllister, 2002). Both of 
these scenarios are pertinent in fitness to drive assessments and self-evaluation of driving 
ability. For clients with neurologic impairment who already have had to face great 
changes in their lifestyle, driving is an integral component of successful community 
reintegration. Clearly, this increases one’s motivation to believe that driving ability is left 
intact following an injury. Second, during the initial recovery process and in rehabilitation 
settings, most patients are rarely faced with driving situations as their cognitive deficits 
preclude any attempts at returning to driving duties. As such, the individual is not 
provided with concrete information from which to make accurate self-evaluations about 
driving ability. This strengthens the argument for the use of driving simulators as a 
potential assessment and rehabilitation tool as it provides the patient with concrete and 
face valid evidence regarding their driving capabilities.
A small number of studies have included self-awareness measures among pre­
driving evaluations and the preliminary results strongly support the notion that self-
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awareness is highly related to driving ability. Heikkila et al. (1999) examined stroke 
patients’ performance on a lab-style driving task. Although patients performed poorly on 
all lab measures (e.g., reaction time to signals, directional errors), they continually 
overestimated their abilities, particularly on attention measures. From these results, they 
concluded “when driving capability is being judged, one of the excluding criteria should 
be the obvious absence of self-criticism including merely denying the symptoms of one’s 
disease” (p.3 54).
Similar to these findings, Schanke and Sundet (2000) examined the predictability 
of neuropsychological testing in determining rates of on-road failures in a mixed 
neurological population composed primarily of stroke patients. Self-awareness, as 
measured by the Awareness Index, was one of the most consistently impaired measures in 
the groups considered not suited for driving. In fact, only measures of reaction time and 
anosognosia significantly differentiated between the participants who passed and failed 
the on-road examination.
Freund and colleagues (Freund, Colgrove, Burke, & McLeod, 2005) explored 
whether elderly drivers of varying driving skill levels differed in their perception of their 
driving evaluation performance and if self-rated driving evaluation performance was 
related to cognitive ability. Consistent with the universal bias, 65% of drivers rated 
themselves as performing better on a driving test than others their age. Furthermore, as 
self-rated driving evaluation performance increased, there was a significantly increased 
risk of unsafe driving. In fact, drivers who considered themselves at least a little better 
than other drivers their age were over four times more likely to be unsafe drivers 
compared to others who believed they were comparable to or worse than other drivers
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their age. This pattern persisted despite the absence of a significant relationship between 
cognitive ability and how drivers rated themselves.
In sum, ISA is a common and potentially devastating consequence of stroke. Most 
theories suggest that self-awareness comprises numerous factors and processes and is 
highly related to other executive functions but the empirical findings remain equivocal. 
Previous research has implemented various techniques in hopes of reliably assessing the 
construct, with most studies using self-report and other-report discrepancy data. Due to 
the inherent limitations of these methods, recent research has shifted to the use of 
predictive performance methods. These results have shown that self-awareness in stroke 
differs depending on the domain or context assessed. One context that has not received 
much research attention is self-evaluation of driving ability in stroke patients. Research in 
this field may be particularly relevant as both theory and empirical data show that self- 
awareness deficits may be especially frequent in contexts involving highly automatized 
and emotionally-invested tasks. One promising mechanism that would allow for a more 
ecologically valid evaluation and possible retraining of driving skill in stroke patients is 
the driving simulator.
The Use of Driving Simulators in Fitness to Drive Evaluations
Although on-road tests are considered by many to the gold standard of evaluating 
driving ability but they are expensive, pose unnecessary safety risks, and only measure 
overt driving behaviour while failing to identify subtle psychological and psychomotor 
impairments that affect these fundamental skills (Klavora, Heslegrove, & Young, 2000). 
Therefore, off-road driving assessments are a safer method for clearly identifying driving 
capacities of stroke survivors. At the same time, off-road determinants of fitness to drive, 
such as medical examinations, psychological assessment, and even pre-driver
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neuropsychological evaluations leave much variance unexplained. Therefore, driving 
simulators are a beneficial alternative because ethical constraints do not always permit 
impaired drivers to undergo on-road driving and the predictive validity of 
neuropsychological pre-driver evaluations remains questionable (Galski, Ehle, & Bruno, 
1990; Schanke & Sundet, 2000; van Zomeren et al., 1987).
Contrary to on-road evaluations, the use of driving simulators provides the 
opportunity to analyze and practice driving situations under a variety of conditions 
without the risk of accident whereas in on-road evaluations, it is impossible to 
consistently assess potentially dangerous situations using vehicles. It allows for repetition, 
review, and immediate feedback regarding performance. Driving simulators are superior 
to pen-and-paper neuropsychological tests because they provide an individual with visual 
information in a similar manner to that encountered in real world driving (Schultheis & 
Mourant, 2001). In comparison to on-road evaluations, it is less costly but still allows for 
the gathering of quantitative data on performance. This information can facilitate 
assessment and allow for monitoring and comparison over time (Mazer et al., 2004). 
Overall, driving simulators are useful in driving assessments as they maintain an 
appropriate balance between public safety and personal autonomy of people with 
impairments caused by cerebral injury (Haselkom et al., 1998). Bieliauskas (2005) 
concluded “driving simulator-based studies are probably the best way to assess the 
likelihood of safe driving when faced with a challenge (i.e., an unusual situation requiring 
decision-making and behavioral response while driving)” (p. 224-5).
Over time, studies of the clinical utility of driving simulators have progressed 
across several levels of validation (Lew et al., 2005). First, at the simplest level, driving 
simulator performance has been examined in terms of sensitivity to different groups of
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drivers (e.g., neurologically impaired versus healthy controls) in order to determine its 
discriminant validity. Second, research has also examined convergent validity by 
investigating the level of agreement between driving simulators, pre-driving cognitive 
screenings, and on-road tests. Finally, recent research has begun to examine the 
ecological validity of driving simulators by looking at performance in relation to driving 
performance in the community.
Currently, there is a scarcity of research examining the validity of driving 
simulators across these various domains, particularly in stroke populations. Most research 
that has been completed has utilized mixed neurological populations or has only focused 
on the relative predictive validity of driving simulators regarding on-road driving 
performance. Driving simulators have been found to be valid measures of real automobile 
driving in healthy participants in terms of speed and positioning (Tomros, 1998). In terms 
of neurological populations, however, the results are less consistent.
Nouri and Tinson (1988) were the first researchers to examine the efficacy of 
driving simulation in determining fitness to drive. In a preliminary study, they examined 
the value of a driving simulator in 38 stroke patients by comparing judgments of driving 
fitness from simulator and road-test. Gradings based on the simulator alone were not good 
predictors of performance; although the simulator provided useful predictions for the 
majority, a significant number of participants were still misclassified in terms of their 
driving safety. Nouri and Tinson’s study had significant technological limitations, which 
compromised the face validity of the driving simulator. In this experiment, the driving 
simulator comprised green light acceleration and braking reaction time variables only.
Very few studies have systematically examined the relationship between driving 
simulators and on-road driving since Nouri and Tinson’s (1998) article. The studies that
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have examined the utility of driving simulators have revealed mixed findings. Some 
researchers have found small correlations between driving simulator and on-road 
performance (e.g., Monga, 1997; Owsley, 1997) or between driving simulator 
performance and subsequent traffic accidents or citations (Keller, Kesserling, & 
Hiltbrunner, 2003) among various populations, thus supporting Nouri and Tinson’s 
questioning regarding the predictive validity of driving simulators. There has been an 
equal number of studies, however, that have found impressive results in populations such 
as stroke and TBI (e.g,. Galski et al., 1992; Lundqvist et al., 2000).
Galski and colleagues (1992) administered a sophisticated and multifaceted 
driving simulator task, a comprehensive neuropsychological battery, and an on-road 
evaluation to a mixed neurological sample (22 TBI, 13 CVA). Whereas 64% of on-road 
performance was explained by measures of visual perception, planning, organization, and 
executive functioning, the driving simulator performance accounted for 63% of the on­
road outcome alone. From this, the authors postulated that the driving simulator was 
superior in predicting on-road performance because, similar to real world driving, it 
tapped into integrated abilities rather than separate abilities usually examined by 
neuropsychological measures.
Lundqvist, Gerdle, and Ronnberg (2000) asked individuals post stroke to complete 
a neuropsychological evaluation, driving simulator, and on-road driving evaluation. The 
comprehensive neuropsychological battery displayed an impressive 83% correct 
classification regarding on-road driving performance (pass/fail dichotomy). The driving 
simulator, however, independently was able to accurately classify 85% of individuals’ 
overall driving skill. Although the results were comparable, both the time and effort put
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forth to complete the comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation far exceeded the 
driving simulator, thus supporting the utility of this procedure.
Some of the incongruence between these studies is attributable to the nature of the 
driving simulators themselves. With improved technology, driving simulators have 
become more sophisticated in terms of the number of variables included, visual output, 
and overall task complexity, all of which make them more comparable to real world 
driving. Most of the studies that failed to show a relationship between driving simulator 
and real-world performance implemented basic, single measures of evaluation, such as 
braking reaction time (Nouri & Tinson, 1988) or lane-tracking (Keller et al., 2003).
One of the few studies that have systematically examined the ecological validity 
of driving simulators was conducted by Lew and colleagues (Lew et al., 2005). Their 
study compared individuals with mixed severity TBI and controls at two phases: the 
baseline phase included an on-road driving test and a driving simulator test; and a 9 
months post-baseline examination incorporating participants’ driving records, number of 
infractions, and observational data. Not surprisingly, the TBI group performed worse on 
all the driving simulator variables than controls. In fact, within the TBI group, 
performance was worse on the driving simulator than the actual road-test. Driving 
simulator measures were significantly correlated with long-term driving outcome and 
showed a strong ability to predict driving skill at the 9-month follow-up (i.e., 82% 
prediction efficiency). The authors concluded that the driving simulator provided unique 
information beyond the road test because it is able to present individuals with a wider and 
less predictable range of driving situations than on-road tests, which may be the reason 
why individuals performed worse on the driving simulator. Although these results suggest 
promising sensitivity, they warrant some caveats regarding driving simulator specificity
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when the difficulty of the driving simulator test is greater than actual on-road 
performance.
The Driving Simulator as a Retraining Tool
A new topic of interest in research has become the utility of the driving simulator 
as a retraining tool. The driving simulator provides a safe yet realistic and comprehensive 
method for retraining neuropsychologically impaired individuals who wish to resume 
driving. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the simulator to driving rehabilitation, 
however, is the potential to elicit awareness. Self-awareness is considered one of the most 
critical aspects of successful rehabilitation (Hartmann-Maeir et al., 2003) and as such any 
instruments that serve to gamer improved awareness of deficit would be of great benefit 
to rehabilitation outcome. Driving simulators, in theory, have potential to be efficacious 
rehabilitation tools as they provide patients with immediate feedback, facilitate discovery 
during task performance, and provide concrete evidence of capabilities. Unlike pen-and- 
paper neuropsychological tests, driving simulators mimic real world driving situations 
and are therefore more likely to elicit increased self-awareness of driving-related skills. In 
other words, it will be easier for a patient to come to realize they have neuropsychological 
deficits that preclude driving if they perform poorly on a test actually involving driving 
rather than on a neuropsychological test that is completely novel and non-contextual.
Very few studies have examined the driving simulator as a rehabilitation 
mechanism and no studies have examined the driving simulator’s relationship to self- 
awareness. Cimolino and Balkovec (1988) reported on the use of a driving simulator in 
the evaluation of training disabled adolescent new drivers and adults with stroke. 
Unfortunately, the authors did not provide details of the training, but reported a large 
increase in driving simulator scores over time for the adolescents. No differences were
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noted for the stroke population. The improved driving simulator performance in this study 
is not surprising given that the outcome measure was also the training measure. Simple 
practice effects would lead to improved performance, although this was not true for the 
stroke survivors. Since this study, there has been no attempt to examine whether driving 
simulators are capable of improving self-awareness deficits known to impede driving 
resumption.
Summary and Present Study
In summary, previous research has revealed driving to be a complex and 
multifaceted process consisting of various levels of cognitive, emotional, and 
motivational factors. Despite theories that suggest their importance and superiority in 
predicting on-road performance, executive functions have only recently begun to be 
investigated. Even when tests of executive functions are included in fitness to drive 
assessments, the test batteries rarely, if ever, examine the full spectrum of executive 
functions, thus leaving some specific processes unexamined. Perhaps the most important 
of these is self-awareness and the ability to use feedback as a mediator for future 
behaviour.
In stroke populations, ISA is evident in various severities and manifestations, 
ranging from severe instances of hemi-neglect to more subtle over-estimations of 
cognitive abilities and degree of recovery. Whereas severe forms of self-awareness 
deficits like neglect are easy to detect and assuredly preclude a return to driving, more 
subtle over-estimations in cognitive abilities may be as crucial an impediment to safe 
driving, yet rarely are assessed in neuropsychological examinations of fitness to drive.
Previous research examining self-awareness has been limited by several 
methodological shortcomings. One of the most problematic has been the inconsistency in
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the operational definition and measurement of the construct. Previous reliance exclusively 
on self-report data or discrepancy analyses using raw scores led to a large amount of 
ambiguity. Recent research has moved toward a metacognitive approach using predicted 
performance experiments. This work has had promising results. Another limitation of 
previous research has been exclusion of control groups. This limitation is particularly 
troubling given the robust findings pertaining to a general human tendency to over­
estimate one’s personal abilities. It is possible that the tendency for individuals to over­
estimate their performance is not exclusive to neurologically impaired populations. 
Regardless of the population being examined, self-awareness is not a unidimensional 
construct but can instead be considered as context-specific and fluctuating. Specifically, it 
is possible that self-awareness differs depending on the novelty of the task. In other 
words, individuals may hold different perceptions of their abilities depending on whether 
the task is novel and unfamiliar (such as neuropsychological tasks) or one well known to 
them and considered automatic (i.e., driving). Also, stroke survivors’ ability to adapt their 
perception of their ability may differ depending on the type of feedback given to them. 
Therefore, implementation of mechanisms such as driving simulators may be more 
successful in altering individuals’ perceptions of their true abilities because, unlike pen 
and paper neuropsychological tests, they demonstrate greater face validity to actual 
driving performance.
Therefore, the purpose of the present study was two-fold. First, this study 
compared stroke survivors’ self-evaluation or awareness of driving performance to that of 
healthy matched controls to determine whether they provided accurate self-evaluations of 
driving ability. Second, it compared both control subjects and stroke survivors’ self- 
awareness on novel and abstract neuropsychological tests and well-leamed/skilled and
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functional driving simulator tasks to determine whether self-awareness changed as a 
function of the context, and if this pattern differed in healthy versus neurologically 
impaired populations.
It was hypothesized that stroke patients would demonstrate greater ISA than 
healthy controls across most measures. Specifically, the stroke patients would show larger 
over-estimations in their rated versus their actual performance on the neuropsychological 
and driving simulator measures. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that the stroke patients, 
as a group, would show less change in their pre- and post-test self-evaluations than the 
control group. Finally, within the stroke group, there would be a significant difference in 
self-evaluation depending on whether the task was perceived to be novel (i.e., 
neuropsychological) or relatively familiar (i.e., driving simulator). Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that the discrepancy between estimated and actual performance would be 
greater on the driving simulator task. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the self- 
evaluation of performance on novel versus familiar tasks would be significantly larger in 
the stroke group than the control participants.
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Chapter 2: Method
Participants
Sixty-six participants (33 stroke survivors, 33 controls) were recruited from 
various sources including the inpatient Stroke and Neuroscience service at the 
Rehabilitation Institute of Michigan (RIM), the outpatient follow-up care at RIM, and the 
RIM Driving Education and Training Center (DETC).
Table 1
Demographic means and standard deviations of stroke and control groups.
Demographic Variable Stroke Group (n=30) Control Group (n= 30)
Age Mean (SD) 54.3 (9.1) 48.5 (13.0)
Range 32-70 20-72
Gender (Male/Female) 15/15 12/18
Education Mean (SD) 13.9 (2.2) 13.7(2.5)
Range 9-20 10-20






Chronicity in Months Mean (SD) 46.0 (65.0)
Range 3-280
Driving Since Stroke? Yes/No 19/11
Stroke survivors were at least 3 months post stroke. In those cases where it was 
possible, the control participants were the patient’s significant other/caregiver to 
minimize demographic confounds. In other cases, the control participant was a close
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family member or friend. Inclusionary criteria for all participants included: having driven 
within 3 months prior to the stroke, or for healthy controls to have driven 3 months prior 
to testing; English as a first language; be between 20 and 70 years of age; and to be 
without a self-reported severe psychiatric diagnosis or history or other neurological 
disorders. Participants received financial compensation for their participation ($50 per 
participant pair). Following data screening (see results section), 60 individuals were 
retained for data analyses. The demographic characteristics of both the stroke and control 
groups can be seen in Table 1.
Materials
Doron AMOS (Advanced Mobile Operation SystenO-2 Driving Simulator. This state-of- 
the-art simulator is completely interactive and provides 240 degrees of visual field 
contained in a life-sized model of a typical automobile cockpit, with sensory feedback 
including sound, vibration, and moving air. Unlike very high-end simulators used for 
military and automotive training, this type of simulator is designed as an advanced 
clinical driving simulator specifically designed for the clinical evaluation of driving- 
related skills. The evaluation takes approximately 45 minutes and includes four sequences 
that simulate “real life” encounters: (a) residential and light business traffic; (b) rural 
traffic and roadways (including lane changes); (c) challenging situations that require 
forethought and quick response time (e.g., near collisions, emergency vehicles); and (d) a 
skills track module that includes assessment of brake reaction, front-end parking, and 
distance estimation. The specific driving scenarios were developed with consultation 
from RIM’s DETC evaluators and the technical consultants at Doron, who are nationally 
recognized as leading experts in evaluation and training of driving skills using simulator 
technology. The driving scenarios scores yield an overall total score, which was used for
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the purpose of the current study. This score is calculated by tallying the total number of 
correct items across all of the scenarios within several domains, including speed, stop 
distance, lane placement, traffic signal use, hazard avoidance, and obeying traffic signs 
and signals.
Trail Making Test-B (TMT-B: Reitan & Wolfson. 19851: This test examines complex 
attention, processing speed, sequencing and cognitive flexibility. It requires the 
connection, by making pencil lines, between 25 encircled numbers and letters in 
alternating order. Test-retest reliability ranges from .67 to .72 (Snow, Tierney, Zorzitto, 
Fischer, & Reid, 1988) in various neuropsychological populations. The test has been 
found to highly sensitive to various forms of brain damage (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). For 
the purposes of this study, normative data was taken from Heaton and colleagues’ well- 
known demographically-adjusted norms for the Halstead-Reitan neuropsychological 
battery (Heaton, Miller, Taylor, & Grant, 2005). This test was included in the current 
study as a result of previous research showing it to be very sensitive to neurocognitive 
impairment and highly related to driving performance (Hopewell, 2002; Schanke & 
Sundet, 2000).
Neuropsychological Assessment Battery-Judgment subtest (NAB Judgment. White & 
Stem. 20011: This test assesses an individual’s judgment and verbal reasoning in the 
context of everyday situations. It includes a series of questions about home safety, health, 
and medical issues likely to be encountered in everyday life. The test includes 10 
questions generated from six categories: 1) home safety; 2) personal hygiene; 3) 
medication safety; 4) motor vehicle driving safety; 5) medical decision making; and 6) 
general judgment. Test-retest reliability is modest (.43), and may result from large 
variability of scores (White & Stem, 2001). Interrater reliability has been reported as .85
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for both forms (White & Stem, 2001). Due to the relative newness of the test, the 
subtest’s validity and sensitivity in stroke populations has yet to be determined. The 
current study used the normative tables provided in the test’s administration manual. This 
test was included in the present study because, unlike some of the other measures, it is not 
time-dependent which allows for evaluation of executive functioning without processing 
speed confound. Also, it provides a verbally rather than visually-based tool.
Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT: Smith. 1991k This test is used to assess visual 
scanning, tracking, motoric speed, and complex attention. It requires the patient to 
examine a series of nine meaningless geometric designs and for each symbol in the 
sequence, search a key for that symbol and substitute a number, either orally or in writing. 
Test-retest reliability has been reported as .80 for the written version and .76 for the oral 
version (Smith, 1991). In terms of validity, the SDMT has been found to be one of the 
most sensitive measures of cerebral integrity in stroke and the single best predictor of 
reduced speed of processing (Ponsford & Kinsella, 1992; Smith, 1991). Normative data 
was taken from also taken from the Heaton norms (Heaton et al., 2005). Similar to the 
TMT-B, the SDMT was chosen for this study due to its strong predictive abilities in terms 
of driving performance (Gouvier et al., 1989).
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT: Benton. Hamsher. & Sivan. 19831: 
This test was developed to evaluate the spontaneous production of words beginning with 
a given letter of the alphabet, thus assessing verbal association fluency, as well as self­
initiation and organization. For letter (phonetic association) fluency, the subject is asked 
to produce orally as many words as possible beginning with a given letter in a limited 
period of time. F, A, and S are the most commonly used letters for this test, although 
alternate forms have also been implemented and standardized (e.g., C, F, and L; P, R, and
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W). Test-retest reliability ranges from .70 to .88 (Bardi, Hamby, & Wilkins, 1995; Snow 
et al., 1988). In terms of validity, Mutchnick and colleagues found letter fluency to be 
among the five best significant discriminators between brain damaged and 
pseudoneurological controls (Mutchnick, Ross, & Long, 1991). The normative data for 
this test was also taken from the Heaton norms (Heaton et al., 2005). Again, this measure 
was selected because it allowed for the evaluation of verbally-based and speeded 
executive functioning.
Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE: Folstein. Folstein. & McHugh. 1975): The 
purpose of this test is to screen for mental impairment, to document intellectual changes 
occurring over time, and to assess the effects of potential factors in cognitive functioning. 
The test consists of 11 items that assess orientation to time and place, 
attention/concentration, language, constructional ability, and immediate and delayed 
recall. Estimates of test-retest reliability generally fall between .80 and .95 (Tombaugh & 
McIntyre, 1992). Most studies report that the MMSE is sensitive to the presence of 
dementia, especially in those with moderate to severe forms of cognitive impairment 
(Spreen & Strauss, 1998).
Metacognitive Awareness of Context-Specific Cognitive Ability (Ergh, 2004): This 
measure borrows from the metacognitive literature and uses Metacognitive Discrepancy 
Scores. Procedures and scoring criteria for the Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores were 
described by Ergh (2004) as follows: Following the standardized administration of task 
instructions, the participant is given a rating scale (see Appendix A) and asked to predict 
his/her performance in comparison to same-aged healthy people (pre-test predicted 
performance ratings). The task is then administered and following this, the participants 
are again asked to rate their performance using the same scale (post-test predicted
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performance ratings). This procedure was performed for each of the neuropsychological 
measures (excluding the MMSE that is only being used as a screening measure) for both 
the stroke and control groups. There were three primary discrepancy scores reflecting 
differences between: a) the predicted and postdicted ratings, b) the predicted ratings and 
actual performance; and, c) the postdicted ratings and actual performance. In order to 
compare the ratings and actual performance, participants’ ratings had to first be converted 
to T scores. Appendix B provides the specific guidelines used to convert patient ratings to 
T-score equivalents. A similar procedure was used for each of the three discrepancy 
scores. Using the pre-test predictions, the patient predicted T-score performance (PPTP) 
for a specific neuropsychological task was subtracted from the patient’s actual T-score 
performance (PATP). The discrepancy scores for each test were averaged to calculate a 
total Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Score. A similar calculation procedure was used 
to calculate the Metacognitive Posttest Discrepancy Score, again using the same four 
executive functions measures (TMT-B, COW AT, SDMT, NAB Judgment).
A similar paradigm was applied to the driving simulator performance as both 
discrepancy scores (Metacognitive Pretest, Metacognitive Posttest) were applied to the 
individual’s overall T-score performance on the simulator. It is important to note that for 
the purposes of these analyses, the Actual Performance T scores for all simulator 
variables were derived from mapping the control group’s performances into a normal T- 
distribution and converting the stroke groups’ performance into T scores accordingly. 
Through this method, the control group’s performance served as the normative sample on 
which the stroke survivors’ performance was measured.
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Procedure
Following recruitment, patients and their significant others/caregivers received 
and completed an informed consent form (see Appendixes C and D). Before completing 
the study, significant others/caregivers completed a brief cognitive screen (MMSE) to 
detect possible cognitive dysfunction. Significant others were excluded from further 
participation if they failed this screening tool (failure was defined as a score below 25 out 
of 30). No individuals were excluded at this point. Due to scheduling restraints, the order 
in which the participants completed the neuropsychological testing and driving simulator 
varied. However, the order of neuropsychological tests and driving simulator scenarios 
was kept consistent across all participants. Due to these scheduling constraints, it was not 
possible to counterbalance the administration of the neuropsychological and simulator 
measures. Before administration, but following standardized instructions for each 
neuropsychological task, the participants were asked to predict their performance by 
answering the question “How well do you think you are going to do in comparison to the 
average person your age?” (pre-test prediction) while provided with the accompanying 
scale (Appendix A). The participants then completed the task and following completion, 
they were asked to re-evaluate their performance according to the same scale (post-test 
prediction). Participants also completed the driving simulator task and received the 
standardized instructions. Before the first scenario, they were asked to predict their 
overall driving simulator performance using the same scale as the neuropsychological 
measures. It is important to note that all individuals were explicitly informed that their 
performance on the driving simulator would have no impact on their driving status. This 
was communicated at the time of recruitment, informed consent, and prior to starting the 
driving simulator.
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Chapter 3: Results
Sixty-six participant pairs (33 stroke survivors, 33 controls) were involved in the 
present study. These participants met all inclusionary criteria. Of the 66 pairs, some 
participants were not able to complete all measures for various reasons. For instance, 
those individuals who experienced significant aphasia following their stroke were not 
able to complete all the neuropsychological measures (COWAT, NAB Judgement). Also, 
some participants experienced mild vertigo or dizziness while attempting to complete the 
driving simulator and discontinued the task. In these instances, discrepancy score 
formulas were adjusted accordingly (i.e., the average scores were calculated using 3, 
instead of 4 scores). For the neuropsychological measures, participants had to have 
completed at least 2 out of 4 tests to be included in analyses. For the simulator, analyses 
were focused on those individuals who completed at least 4 of the 7 scenarios, ensuring 
that at least 3 of the same 4 scenarios were examined. After implementing these 
limitations, 3 stroke survivors and 2 control participants were eliminated from further 
analyses.
Prior to analysis, the data were screened for violations of assumptions associated 
with all tests (e.g., normality, linearity, outliers, multicollinearity). This analysis revealed 
one control participant who was a multivariate outlier across numerous variables. As 
such, this case was eliminated from further analyses. Following all preliminary data 
screening, a total of 30 stroke survivors and 30 controls were used in all subsequent 
analyses.
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Table 2
Oneway ANOVA comparisons of stroke and control group T scores on


























Note: TMT-B=Trail Making Test-Part B; SDMT=Symbol Digit Modalities Test; 
COWAT=Controlled Oral Word Association Test; NAB =Neuropsychological 
Assessment Battery Judgment subtest 
Note: *** p  < .001; ** p  < .01; *p < .05
Independent t tests were conducted to examine whether the stroke and control 
groups differed in terms of demographic characteristics (see Table 1), including age and 
education. There were no significant differences between the two group in terms of age 
(t(58) = 1.97,p  = .053) or education level (t(58) = 0.27,p  = .79). Table 2 shows the 
means and standard deviations of each of the neuropsychological measures for both 
groups.
The stroke group performed significantly worse than the control group on all 
neuropsychological tests with the greatest difference seen on SDMT and TMT-B. In 
terms of driving simulator overall performance, the stroke group performed significantly 
worse than controls.
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Hypothesis 1: Stroke patients will display less self-awareness of deficits than healthy 
controls on all measures. For the purpose of this hypothesis, participants’ self-awareness 
was examined using two different analyses. First, oneway ANOVAs were conducted on 
the Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Score (self-awareness prior to feedback) and the 
Metacognitive Posttest Discrepancy Score (self-awareness following feedback) to 
determine whether the two groups differed significantly in the accuracy of their pre- and 
post-test evaluations of performance. It was hypothesized that the stroke group would 
demonstrate significantly larger discrepancy scores than the control group. Second, 
correlations between their actual performance and their pre-test and post-test ratings, and 
pre-post test discrepancies were examined to determine whether an individual’s self- 
evaluations were related to how well they actually performed (i.e., did those people who 
attained higher scores rate themselves accordingly?). Pearson correlations were 
performed for all neuropsychological measures, as well the overall performance on the 
driving simulator. It was hypothesized that the stroke group would demonstrate lower 
correlations between their pre- and post-test ratings and actual performance. Means and 
standard deviations for the actual scores, as well as the predicted and postdicted ratings 
(in T scores) for both groups are reported in Table 3.
Table 4 shows the oneway ANOVA comparisons between participants’ 
Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Scores (Actual-Predicted) and Metacognitive Posttest 
Discrepancy Scores (Actual - Postdicted). It is important to note that because participants’ 
ratings were subtracted from their actual performance, negative values indicated 
overestimation of performance and positive values represented underestimations. In terms 
of the Metacognitive Pretest Discrepancy Scores, significant differences existed between 
the stroke survivors and controls across all the neuropsychological measures, with the
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exception of NAB Judgment. The stroke survivors consistently demonstrated significantly 
higher overpredictions of their performance than the healthy controls. This pattern was 
particularly evident on both the TMT-B and SDMT tests, suggesting that stroke survivors 
may demonstrate disporportionate ISA in areas of processing speed and cognitive 
flexibility.
Table 3
Actual performance, pre-test and post-test ratines (in T scores') of stroke and control 
groups for neuropsychological variables and overall driving simulator performance.
Stroke Mean (SD) Control Mean (SD)
Actual Predicted Postdicted Actual Predicted Postdicted
TMT-B 32.9(14.1) 49.3 (6.6) 45.6 (8.2) 49.3 (11.4) 51.5 (6.6) 50.4 (6.0)
SDMT 27.2(13.3) 50.6(7.1) 48.4 (7.5) 46.1 (11.8) 52.0 (6.6) 50.7 (6.0)
COWAT 36.8 (14.6) 49.3 (7.1) 45.6 (8.7) 49.1 (9.7) 50.5 (4.9) 49.0 (6.4)
NAB 43.3 (12.4) 50.3 (6.7) 52.9 (5.9) 51.9(11.3) 54.4 (6.4) 56.6 (5.8)
Mean NP 34.2 (11.7) 49.5 (5.9) 47.7 (6.3) 49.1 (8.1) 52.1 (5.1) 51.7(4.6)
Simulator 38.0(12.5) 52.4 (7.5) 47.8 (6.4) 50.0 (10.0) 54.1 (8.0) 50.2 (5.8)
Similar overprediction was observed on simulator performance (see Table 4). The 
stroke group showed significantly larger overestimations in their pre-simulator ratings 
versus actual performance. In contrast, the control group displayed relatively accurate 
predictions of their performance although they still tended to over-estimate their actual 
performance. Across all measures, examination of the means and standard deviations of 
the pre-test estimations show the stroke group to rate themselves very similarly to those 
individuals who had no history of stroke.
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Table 4
Oneway ANOVA comparisons of Metacognitive Pre-test and Post-test Discrepancy 
Scores for stroke survivors and controls on neuropsychological and simulator T scores.
Variable Stroke Mean (SD) Controls Mean (SD) F Eta2
Actual - Predicted
TMT-B -16.3 (14.2) -2.3 (10.7) 18.6*** .25
SDMT -23.3 (14.3) -6.3 (12.2) 23.3*** .30
COWAT -12.5 (14.3) -1.4 (9.6) 12.3** .18
NAB -6.9 (12.5) -2.4(11.4) 2.0 .04
Overall NP -15.3 (11.0) -3.0 (7.7) 25.1*** .30
Simulator .14.4 (14.4) -4.1 (9.2) 10.8** .16
Actual -  Postdicted
TMT-B -12.6 (10.5) -1.1 (10.6) 17.5*** .24
SDMT -21.3 (11.6) -5.1 (11.7) 27.6*** .33
COWAT -7.9(10.7) 0.1 (9.3) 9 1** .14
NAB -9.6(12.5) -4.7 (10.6) 2.6 .05
Overall NP 13.4 (9.5) -2.6 (7.7) 23.5*** .29
Simulator -9.8(11.4) -0.2 (9.2) 12.7*** .18
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
Because it is clearly more difficult to predict or evaluate one’s performance prior 
to actually completing a task (i.e., in the absence of any feedback), the Metacognitive 
Posttest Discrepancy Scores were computed to determine whether stroke survivors, even 
in the presence of immediate feedback (i.e., completing the task), would demonstrate 
continued ISA. This analysis revealed a consistent pattern to that seen in the pre-test 
evaluations; that is, the stroke group consistently overpredicted their performance by a 
significantly greater margin than the control group on all neuropsychological measures, 
with the exception of NAB Judgment. Again, the same pattern emerged in which their 
overpredictions were particularly large on measures of processing speed and cognitive 
flexibility (TMT-B, SDMT). The stroke survivors also over-predicted their performance 
following the simulator more than their healthy counterparts.
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Both groups had a tendency to overestimate their performances across both 
neuropsychological and driving measures. Overall, both groups tended to rate themselves 
as average in comparison to same-aged peers, which was generally accurate for the 
control group but not for the stroke survivors. Overall, the stroke group contained 
significantly more individuals who overestimated both before and after their 
neuropsychological performance (Pre-test: %2(1,59) = 6.70, p < .01; Post-test: %2(1,59)
= 11.92, p  < .001). Of the stroke survivors, approximately two-thirds (67.9%) of them 
overpredicted by at least one full standard deviation (10 T-score points) their mean 
neuropsychological pre-test predictions and 78.3% of them demonstrated a mean 
neuropsychological overestimation of at least 1 standard deviation following the tests. In 
contrast, only one third (32.1%) of the control group overestimated their average 
performance by one standard deviation prior to the administration and only 21.7% of 
them continued to overestimate following completion.
Correlational analyses were used to examine the strength of the relationships 
between an individual’s predictions, postdictions, and actual task performance (see Table 
5). The control group’s predictions exhibited moderate correlations with actual 
performance, with the exception of SDMT and NAB Judgment. Those healthy individuals 
who tended to perform better also predicted higher performance prior to testing. In 
contrast, the stroke survivors’ pre-test evaluations were statistically unrelated to the level 
of actual performance across most of the individual tests and simulator scores (except 
FAS). This group, however, displayed a trend in which their predictions varied 
consistently with actual performance. Once collapsed into an average neuropsychological 
variable, the stroke survivors also demonstrated a positive relationship between their pre-
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test predictions and actual performance. In terms of overall driving performance, the 
healthy controls again displayed significant correlations between their predictions and 
actual performance, whereas the stroke group’s pre-simulator ratings were not related to 
their level of actual performance.
Table 5
Pearson correlations (r) of the predicted and postdicted ratines, and the predicted- 
postdicted discrepancy scores with participants’ actual T-score performance in both 
stroke and control groups.
Trails B SDMT
NAB
Judgment FAS Mean NP Simulator





























Pre-Post -.51” .05 -.56" -.03 .08 -.14 -.47" -.25 -.47" .10 -.32* .24
Note: Str. = Stroke survivors; Cont. = Controls
** p  < .01; * p  < .05
There are several patterns within the correlations between postdicted ratings and 
actual performance that suggested that the stroke survivors may have benefited modestly 
from feedback during both the neuropsychological and simulator contexts. First, 
postdicted ratings were strongly related to actual performance across all 
neuropsychological and driving measures, with the exception of NAB Judgment. 
Following the completion of the task, those who performed better also rated themselves 
higher and vice versa. Second, in most tasks, the stroke survivors demonstrated larger 
correlations between their postdicted ratings and actual performance than between their 
predicted ratings and actual performance, suggesting that their accuracy in self-rating 
improved with immediate feedback.
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The control group continued to demonstrate significant correlations between their 
actual performance and self-evaluations as seen by moderate correlations with postdicted 
ratings across both neuropsychological and driving measures. The strength of the 
correlations was generally consistent from pre- and post-test ratings.
In terms of the discrepancy between pre-test and post-test self-estimates (pre-post 
Discrepancy score), the pattern of correlations showed an interesting trend. There were 
significant inverse correlations between actual performance and pre-post discrepancy 
scores in the stroke group. As a stroke survivor’s actual performance improved, the 
discrepancy between predicted and postdicted ratings decreased; conversely, as a stroke 
survivor’s performance was poorer, the discrepancy between predicted and postdicted 
ratings increased. Thus, the gap between prediction and postdiction tended to be more 
narrow for stroke survivors who did indeed perform relatively well, whereas the gap 
between prediction and postdiction tended to widen (show more shift) among survivors 
who performed most poorly. Overall, it appears that amount of shift in the survivor’s 
awareness was strongly related to their overall performance in both neuropsychological 
and driving settings. Especially for survivors who performed poorly, the experience of 
actually performing the tasks produced more accurate self-ratings of performance as 
compared to prediction. This pattern was not observed in the control group as there were 
no significant relationships between the actual performance and pre-post discrepancy 
scores. However, since the control group was more accurate to begin with, they required 
less shift in their ratings from pre- to post-testing. Unlike the stroke group, the control 
group demonstrated a much greater restriction of range in their ratings. In other words, 
since most of them performed within the average range, they had less room to adjust their 
self-estimates in order to remain accurate.
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Overall, the results of the first set of analyses strongly support the first hypothesis. 
As a group, the stroke survivors demonstrated significantly greater discrepancies between 
their estimated and actual performance, both before and after completion of the tasks, 
thus indicating clinically significant ISA. Significantly larger proportions of stroke 
survivors overestimated their performance by at least one full standard deviation than 
healthy controls both pre- and post-testing. Despite this ISA, the correlational analyses 
suggest that the stroke group are capable of benefiting from feedback, given substantially 
stronger correlations between self-estimates and actual performance at post-testing as 
compared to pre-testing. The purpose of Hypothesis 2 was to determine if the stroke 
survivors differed significantly from healthy controls in their reaction to feedback. 
Hypothesis 2: Stroke patients will show less variation in pre- and post-test self- 
evaluations (less reaction to feedback) in comparison to controls. For this comparison, the 
Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy scores were evaluated. A negative value represented 
a higher postdiction (i.e., participants thought they did better than they had predicted after 
completion) whereas a positive value meant a lower postdiction (i.e., individuals believed 
they did worse than originally predicted). These discrepancies were then averaged and the 
two groups were compared via independent t tests. It was hypothesized that the stroke 
group would display significantly smaller Pre-Post Discrepancy scores than the control 
group.
The two groups did not differ significantly in their pre-post ratings discrepancies 
across most measures (see Table 6). When all the neuropsychological measures were 
averaged, however, the stroke group displayed significantly more shift in their ratings 
(i.e., decreasing their post-test ratings in relation to pre-test ratings) than the controls. In
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general, both groups displayed very little absolute shift in their appraisals following 
feedback.
Table 6
Independent t tests comparing Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy Scores for stroke 
survivors and control groups.




df t p  (one-tailed)
Pre -  Post 
TMT-B 3.7 (8.1) 1.1 (5.6) 57 1.4 .08
SDMT 2.2 (5.0) 1.2 (5.6) 57 0.7 .25
COWAT 3.4 (6.4) 1.5 (4.9) 55 1.3 .10
NAB -2.7 (5.3) -2.3 (3.3) 55 -0.3 .38
Overall NP 1.9 (3.3) 0.4 (3.0) 58 1.9 .03
Simulator 4.7 (7.6) 3.9 (6.3) 58 .42 .34
Because previous analyses revealed the control group to be relatively accurate in 
their initial prediction, there was not as much need to significantly alter their post-test 
ratings, hence the minimal shift. In contrast, the stroke group’s pre-test predictions were 
quite discrepant from their actual performance which left much more opportunity for shift 
in ratings. Thus, the degree of initial inaccuracy may have influenced the degree of shift. 
To control for this potential confound, the pre-post discrepancy scores were adjusted to 
account for baseline predictions (i.e., discrepancy scores were divided by pre-test rating 
to calculate a “percentage shift” in rating variable). After accounting for the degree of 
“off-prediction” evident during the pre-test ratings, the stroke group continued to show 
significantly larger percentage shift in their post-test ratings in their average 
neuropsychological performance (1(58) = 2.1, p  = .02).
Unlike the neuropsychological composite, the two groups did not differ 
significantly in their Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy Scores during the driving 
simulator performance (see Table 6). Both groups appeared to benefit from feedback as
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post-simulator ratings were lower than pre-simulator predictions (see Table 3). Overall, 
these results did not support the hypothesis that stroke survivors would demonstrate less 
variation in their pre-post ratings. The results of this analysis suggest that stroke 
survivors’ ability to benefit from feedback may differ depending on the nature of the task, 
which was examined by the study’s third hypothesis and analyses.
Hypothesis 3: The stroke group will show a disproportionate unawareness of driving 
simulator performance (in comparison to neuropsychological tasks') than controls. 
Separate mixed-model ANOVAs each compared the Metacognitive Pre-Test and 
Metacognitive Post-Test Discrepancy Scores of the stroke and control groups for overall 
driving simulator and overall neuropsychological performance. The between groups 
variable was group membership (Stroke versus Controls) whereas the within groups 
variable was domain assessed (neuropsychological composite or driving simulator). As 
per the hypothesis, it was expected that a main effect would be found for group 
membership and domain, as well as a significant interaction between these variables.
In terms of Metacognitive Pre-test Discrepancy Scores, there was a significant 
main effect for group (F(l,58) = 25.4,p  < .001, r\2 = .31) as the stroke group displayed 
significantly larger overpredictions than the controls, a finding consistent with previous 
analyses. In contrast, there was no main effect for domain (F( 1,58) = .01, p  = .94) as 
there was no significant difference between the magnitude of overprediction of the 
neuropsychological and simulator performances. As can be seen in Figure 1, the 
interaction between group and domain was also not significant (F(l,58) = .35, p  = .56) as 
the stroke group showed less accurate ratings regardless of domain.
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Figure 1: The relationship between Metacognitive Pre-test Discrepancy Scores. Group 
Membership, and Domain.
Note: The above representations of the Metacognitive Pre-test Discrepancy Scores are in positive values to 
display the pattern of over-prediction from actual performance (values closer to 0 represent more accurate 
estimations)
In terms of Metacognitive Post-test Discrepancy Scores, a similar pattern 
emerged. Again, a significant group main effect was seen (F(1,58) = 24.88,/? < .001, r\2 = 
.30) as well as a significant domain main effect (F(l,58) = 4.87,/? < .05, r\ = .08) as the 
postdiction discrepancy with actual performance was greater in the stroke group and 
significantly higher for the neuropsychological measures. The group X domain 
interaction was not significant (F(l,58) = .21,/? = .65) suggesting that the two groups did 
not differ significantly in their pattern of postdiction ratings across domains.
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Figure 2: The relationship between Metacognitive Post-test Discrepancy Scores. Group 
Membership, and Domain.
As the final part of the analyses, the Metacognitive Pre-test and Post-test 
Discrepancy Score were collapsed into an omnibus mixed model ANOVA. For this 
analysis, the between groups variables was group membership while both domain 
(neuropsychological versus simulator) and time (pre- versus post-test) were entered as 
within subjects variables. As with previous results, there was a large main effect for group 
(F(l,58) = 26.54,p  < .001, r|2 = .31) as the stroke survivors demonstrated higher over­
estimations before and after the tests. There was also a large main effect for time (F(l,58) 
= 28.88, p  < .001, t |2 = .33) as both groups demonstrated significantly larger over­
estimations of their performance prior to testing in comparison to post-test predictions. In 
other words, both groups appeared to benefit from the immediate feedback inherent in 
completing the tasks and as such their predictions became more accurate. In particular, 
both groups showed more accurate postdictions of simulator performance in comparison 
to neuropsychological measures as evidenced by a significant domain X time interaction 
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group’s shift in awareness from before to after testing did not differ across domains and 
differently than the control group as the test X time X group interaction did not reach 
significance (F(l,58) = .145,/? = .70).
Overall, the results of the third analyses did not support the hypothesis. Although 
the stroke group displayed significantly from the controls in the accuracy of their ratings, 
this pattern did not differ depending on the domain. There was, however, a domain effect 
observed as both groups combined showed more accurate ratings of their driving 
simulator performance following feedback.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the nature of self-awareness deficits and 
how they manifest in driving-related performance following stroke. To investigate the 
relationship between self-awareness and driving simulator abilities, the study had stroke 
survivors and healthy controls evaluate their performance on various driving simulator 
and neuropsychological tasks. By having participants rate familiar driving skills and 
novel neuropsychological performance, this study investigated whether self-awareness 
changed as a function of the context involved. Consistent with previous research, it was 
hypothesized that stroke survivors would demonstrate ISA, defined as significantly larger 
discrepancies between their actual and estimated performance (i.e., larger estimated than 
actual scores) than healthy controls. Second, it was hypothesized that stroke survivors 
would benefit less from immediate feedback than healthy controls as could be observed 
by significantly less shift between pre- and post-test self-evaluations. Finally, it was 
hypothesized that the nature of ISA within the stroke group would differ as a function of 
the context. Given universal self-enhancement biases regarding driving ability, as well the 
emotional valence placed on driving ability, it was hypothesized that the stroke group 
would show poorer self-awareness on driving simulator performance in comparison to 
neuropsychological measures.
The results of this study strongly supported the first hypothesis as the stroke 
survivors significantly overestimated their actual performance on almost all 
neuropsychological and driving simulator variables. This overestimation was present both 
before and after completion of each task and the degree of overestimation was 
significantly larger than healthy controls. In general, both groups rated themselves as 
average in comparison to their same-aged peers, an appraisal that was accurate for the
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healthy controls but not for the stroke survivors, who generally performed at least one to 
two standard deviations below the norm. Clinically, these scores correspond to the mildly 
to moderately impaired range in comparison to same-aged peers, the same group to which 
they rated themselves. Even after completing the task, almost 4 of every 5 stroke 
survivors overestimated their performance by at least one full standard deviation, whereas 
only approximately 1 of 5 healthy controls did. The stroke survivors’ ISA was noticeably 
greater during tasks involving visuomotor processing speed (e.g., TMT-B, SDMT).
Contrary to the second hypothesis, several analyses revealed that the stroke 
survivors were able to benefit from feedback as indicated by significant shift from pre- to 
post-test self-ratings of performance. First, the stroke group’s pre-test ratings were not 
related to their actual performance whereas post-test ratings were significantly correlated 
with actual performance. Second, significant correlations between Pre-Post Discrepancy 
scores and actual performance suggest that the stroke survivors that performed better 
were able to readjust their self-evaluations more accurately. In other words, the gap 
between actual and estimated performance decreased as individuals performed better. 
Finally, although there was no significant difference in the amount of shift on each 
individual neuropsychological test, the Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy Score for the 
neuropsychological composite was significantly larger for the stroke group, indicating 
that the stroke group, to some degree, recalibrated (i.e., decreased) their post-test ratings 
in comparison to pre-test ratings. Whereas the control group was accurate from the 
beginning (and thus requiring little shift following the task), the stroke group was quite 
inaccurate prior to the testing, thus allowing much room for improvement in accuracy. 
Even when controlling for the degree of initial inaccuracy, this pattern remained 
indicating that the stroke group still showed greater response to feedback. It is important
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to note, however, that his improvement was one of relative proportions, as the stroke 
group remained significantly inaccurate even following feedback.
Unlike the neuropsychological performance, the stroke survivors did not differ 
from the control groups in their ratings shift following feedback from the driving 
simulator. In fact, both groups showed a larger shift in their ratings during the simulator 
task in comparison to the neuropsychological measures. Although this pattern suggests 
that self-awareness differs across contexts, it is not a phenomena exclusive to stroke. 
Previous researchers have postulated that affective and motivational factors are just as, if 
not more, important than cognitive ones in determining awareness (Flashman & 
McAllister, 2002; Marcel, 2004). Therefore, it would be expected that when faced with a 
task so relevant to an individual’s independence such as driving, one would display an 
emotional defence mechanism precluding one from accurately evaluating one’s abilities. 
As such, it was hypothesized that stroke survivors would display less self-awareness of 
driving deficits rather than less emotionally-laden neuropsychological tasks. Overall, the 
results of the analyses did not support this hypothesis. Although the stroke survivors 
exhibited significantly larger overestimations across all domains, there was no difference 
in the magnitude of this overestimation between neuropsychological and driving variables 
prior to task completion. On both neuropsychological and driving variables, the stroke 
survivors and their healthy counterparts exhibited more accurate ratings following task 
completion, thus indicating some ability to benefit from feedback. Contrary to 
expectations, this was particularly true of the driving simulator tasks as there was a 
significant difference between post-simulator and post-neuropsychological self- 
evaluations. In other words, both groups were able to benefit from the immediate and 
concrete feedback inherent to the driving simulator more so than they could from the
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novel neuropsychological tests. This pattern again suggested that self-awareness may 
differ as a result of context or task involved, but this may represent a universal 
phenomenon rather than one specific to neurological populations such as stroke.
ISA and Driving Ability Following Stroke
The results of the current study both replicate and expand upon previous research 
investigating self-awareness and driving-related performance following stroke. As 
expected, the stroke survivors’ performance was significantly lower than healthy controls 
across all executive functioning tasks, with most scores in the mildly or moderately 
impaired range clinically. This is consistent with previous research that has showed stroke 
survivors performing worse on a variety of driving components including reaction time, 
visual scanning, information processing speed, distractibility, poor judgement, and 
attention deficits (Ball & Owsley, 1992; Engum et al., 1988; Sundet et al., 1995). The 
stroke group also performed well below the normative sample in terms of overall driving 
simulator performance. This is not surprising given that stroke survivors did poorly on 
individual executive tasks and good driving simulator performance requires a higher- 
order integration and application of these skills in a coordinated and purposeful action, 
that in itself which could be considered a critical executive function.
Despite these performance deficits across all domains, the stroke survivors 
displayed ISA as they consistently rated themselves as average in comparison to same 
aged peers. In fact, their estimations were essentially comparable to a group of 
individuals who have never suffered a stroke at all. This level of ISA is consistent with 
previous research regardless of how self-awareness has been measured (e.g., self versus 
significant other, self versus therapist, actual versus predicted performance). The findings 
from this study support the results found by Marcel and colleagues (2004) who used a
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similar actual versus predicted performance paradigm to examine the self-awareness of 
stroke patients on a verbal fluency and mental flexibility task. Overall, the patients that 
demonstrated more severe neuropsychological impairments were also more likely to show 
more ISA (i.e., higher overestimations). Most patients were more accurate in their post­
test ratings in comparison to pre-test ratings. From this pattern, the researchers concluded 
that accurate awareness of deficit required some calibration based on direct personal 
experience with the deficit and a special type of mental flexibility that allowed for 
adjustment of behaviour based on experience. The results of this study replicate these 
findings as the correlational analyses revealed that those stroke survivors who achieved 
higher actual performance across most measures also showed more accurate postdictions 
and the most potential to benefit from feedback given lower pre-post discrepancies. Those 
who performed worse also showed higher levels of ISA. Consistent with Marcel’s theory 
of the importance of mental flexibility in predicting self-awareness, the stroke group, who 
showed greater ISA, also showed significantly lower performance on neuropsychological 
measures of mental flexibility (TMT-B) during the present study.
The results of this study, as well as Marcel’s conclusions, are consistent with 
previous metacognitive and cognitive psychological theory. Although both groups 
demonstrated general self-enhancement bias, the ISA exhibited by the stroke survivors in 
the current study cannot be explained by this alone as the degree of overestimation was 
significantly larger than the normal controls. It is probable that individuals who have 
suffered neurological injury lack several of the cognitive processes needed to accurately 
rate their performance. Of these, mental flexibility and adjustment skills may be of 
particular interest. According to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic proffered by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), one way to make judgements under uncertainty is to
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anchor on previous information that comes to mind and adjust until a plausible estimate is 
reached; therefore, either inaccurate initial anchors or insufficient adjustment commonly 
invoke judgemental bias. Within this framework, it has been proposed that initial 
information tends to exert undue influence on subsequent adjustment processes, leaving 
final estimates too close to the original anchor (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Therefore, it is 
possible, that following a neurological event such as stroke, an individual uses their 
previous driving experience as the anchor on which they base their post-stroke ratings. In 
other words, if an individual considered himself or herself to be either an average or 
above average driver prior to their stroke, this preconceived anchor would bias one’s 
ability to adjust one’s ratings according to new information (i.e., stroke sequelae) and as a 
result the individual would continue to himself or herself as average or above.
Although the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic appears to be a universal 
phenomenon, it is very probable that neurological injuries that hinder one’s cognitive 
flexibility, such as stroke, would demonstrate an exaggerated pattern. Similar to 
inaccurate initial anchors, insufficient adjustment may also help explain the presentation 
of ISA observed during the present study. Consistent with the theories implicating 
decreased mental flexibility in ISA, it is probable that stroke survivors have more 
difficulty with the complicated and effortful assessment required to adjust from self- 
ratings. Recent research has shown that people adjust insufficiently from an initial anchor 
value because they stop adjusting once their adjustments fall within an implicit range of 
plausible values (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). This would explain why the stroke group, 
despite poor performance, rated themselves within the average range of abilities in 
comparison to same-aged peers, as average is where most individuals fall across most 
domains. Finally, it is possible that stroke survivors, in general, lack the ability to make
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accurate estimates about ambiguous information regardless of whether the information 
pertains to themselves or others. This is consistent with previous research that suggests 
that stroke survivors perform significantly worse on measures of cognitive estimation 
(Scott et al., 2007).
Previous studies have revealed contradictory results pertaining to the nature of 
self-awareness deficits across different domains or contexts. Some researchers have 
reported that following stroke, some individuals exhibit the largest overestimations during 
motor-based tasks, while rating themselves as more impaired on cognitive and emotional 
variables (Gauggel et al., 2000). In contrast, Prigatano and colleagues (1990) reported 
greater ISA in traumatic brain injury survivors of social interaction skills, emotional 
control, and cognitive tasks in comparison to physical activities and basic self-care in 
which individuals were more accurate. Fischer et al. (2004) reported that individuals who 
had suffered a stroke only overestimated their performance on memory testing whereas 
simple motor tasks (i.e., finger tapping) were rated accurately. These discrepancies could 
be explained by the fact that physical limitations and basic self care disabilities are readily 
recognizable deficits that allow for direct observation (e.g., hemiplegia, not being able to 
dress oneself) whereas more cognitively based deficits, such as memory and processing 
speed are more subtle. Of the cognitive-based deficits, executive functioning tasks, in 
particular, have been reported to be the most strongly related to ISA (Burgess et al., 1998) 
and as such, were chosen to be used in the current study. By using the tests most related 
self-awareness, it would allow for a better comparison of whether self-awareness does 
fluctuate depending on the nature of the task involved.
The current study supports the notion that ISA may be prominent during abstract 
and cognitive-based tasks as stroke survivors showed ISA on almost all the executive
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functioning tasks, even after feedback. The areas that the stroke survivors demonstrated 
the most ISA were on tasks that required visual scanning, cognitive flexibility, and 
processing speed (TMT-B and SDMT) and it remained quite resilient even after feedback. 
The lack of awareness within these domains is particularly problematic given that these 
tasks are consistently found to be some of the most predictive of on-road performance and 
driving skills (Hopewell, 2002; Mazer et al., 1998; Schanke & Sundet, 2000; Sundet et 
al., 1995).
The results of the current study provide insight into the manifestations of driving 
awareness following stroke as much of the previous research has investigated the 
relationship between driving and stroke, or self-awareness and stroke, but has not 
systematically investigated all three factors. Whereas the ISA associated with 
neuropsychological deficits may result from the fact that they are subtle and not easily 
detected by an individual, driving ability provides a more concrete indicator of abilities. 
Despite this, the stroke survivors still showed very inaccurate estimations of their abilities 
in this context as well. Previous studies have shown individuals with neurological 
impairments, such as TBI, to perform significantly worse on driving simulators than 
healthy controls (Lew et al., 2005). Whereas some researchers have suggested that stroke 
survivors are capable of making accurate judgements about driving ability (Golper et al., 
1980), others have reported the opposite (Hartje et al., 1991). Fisk and colleagues 
reported that 30% of stroke survivors resumed driving following stroke, although less 
than 10% sought out any formal evaluation of driving skills, suggesting the possibility of 
poor insight into driving -related deficits. The results of the present study help clarify 
these controversial findings by showing that most stroke survivors have very poor 
awareness of driving deficits following their injuries. Since the stroke group consisted of
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both drivers and non-drivers (approximately 2:1, respectively), it appears that the ISA 
exists regardless of actual driving exposure, which is particularly disconcerting. However, 
this is consistent with previous reports (Coleman et al., 2002) that have shown no 
differences in perception of driving abilities between those individuals who have and 
have not resumed driving following neurological injury. The level of ISA for driving 
ability displayed by the present stroke group is also consistent with findings suggesting 
that awareness of one’s driving limitations to be unrelated to objective driving records 
and direct evidence accidents (Marottoli & Richardson, 1998). Unlike this research, the 
current study did reveal that stroke survivors, similar to the general population, are 
capable of benefiting from the type of feedback inherent to driving simulator exposure, a 
phenomenon not previously detected by earlier self-awareness measures. The temporal 
stability of such benefit, however, has yet to be determined.
Metacognitive Discrepancy Scores and ISA
Clearly, the results of the current study show the use of the Metacognitive 
Discrepancy scores as valid measures of self-awareness. While the current findings are 
consistent with previous research implementing this technique (Ergh, 2004; Marcel et al., 
2004), it is important to note that they also reveal similar conclusions about the 
manifestations of ISA using other methodologies, suggesting a promising degree of 
concurrent validity. One of the most often used indices of ISA has been examining the 
discrepancy between a patient’s self-ratings and the ratings of that patient’s significant 
other, caregiver, or health professional/therapist. The ISA demonstrated during the 
current study is commensurate with previous studies that have found stroke survivors 
significantly and continually over-rate their performance in comparison to their 
therapist’s rating of the same domain (Hartman-Maeir et al., 2003). As it pertains to
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driving, previous studies (Coleman et al., 2002) have shown that patients’ perceptions of 
their abilities did not differ between groups of individuals who had and had not returned 
to driving. In contrast, significant others’ ratings of abilities were significantly different 
between driver and non-drivers and only the significant other’s rating of the patient’s 
fitness to drive made any significant contribution to the prediction of driving status. 
Similarly, in a recent study by Scott and colleagues (2007), stroke survivors showed 
disproportionate overestimations of driving ability in comparison to healthy counterparts 
when asked about rating their driving performance. Interestingly, stroke survivors 
exhibited more accurate self-appraisals when different frame of references were used. In 
other words, when asked to compare themselves to their significant other, stroke 
survivors rated themselves lower than if comparing themselves to the general population. 
This pattern suggests that a concrete and tangible frame of reference may play a role in 
eliciting self-awareness. This is consistent with the present findings showing that both 
stroke survivors and healthy controls showed more accurate self-ratings following driving 
simulator performance. Overall, the results of the current study expand upon previous 
findings by showing that overestimations of driving ability in stroke survivors occur, not 
only in subjective comparisons, but also in more objective actual versus prediction 
paradigms.
Clinical Implications
In terms of clinical and practical implications, this study contributes to the current 
knowledge surrounding rehabilitation of deficits following stroke and the use of driving 
simulators as an effective rehabilitation tool. The current study has expanded on the 
present literature by providing a sensitive and valid indicator of self-awareness of deficit. 
Past research has utilized self-reports or significant other opinions as a basis of
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evaluation. Unlike these previous attempts that rely solely on subjective reports, the use 
of the Metacognitive Discrepancy scores allows for an objective comparison between an 
individual’s actual and estimated performance. The use of significant other reports has 
been proven to be a very effective tool in the accurate evaluation of cognitive and 
behavioural deficits (Coleman et al., 2002), particularly when it comes to activities of 
daily living, such as driving. This measurement approach has its shortcomings, however, 
with perhaps the most important being the difficulty in being fully objective when one’s 
decision may have significant consequences for their life as well. For instance, for an 
elderly couple in which the stroke survivor was the only one of the pair who had a valid 
driver’s license, asking the significant other to objectively evaluate their ability to drive 
would carry with it significant consequences to the couple’s independence. As such, it 
would not be surprising if the significant other provided a less critical account of driving 
ability, even when faced with evidence to the contrary. In addition, asking the significant 
other to be the gatekeeper to their partner’s independence could easily lead to marital 
conflict and undue stress, both of which would be detrimental to the recovery process and 
psychosocial functioning. The use of actual versus predicted performance paradigms 
takes the responsibility away from the significant other while still providing a reliable 
index of one’s abilities. In fact, this approach is ideal in a neuropsychological and 
rehabilitation setting because it allows for an objective evaluation of actual 
neuropsychological functioning as well as an evaluation of insight into one’s deficits, 
both of which are significantly predictive of rehabilitation outcome and prognosis.
The introduction of a Pre-Post Metacognitive Discrepancy score in the current 
study also has several clinical advantages. It is possible that the type of ISA differs 
depending on whether an individual is asked to predict performance either before or after
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testing. Pre-test self-evaluations can give the clinician a broad sense of global awareness 
of deficit. For instance, most neuropsychological test instructions provide the individual 
with an idea of what they are going to be asked to do and also the skills involved (i.e., on 
timed tasks, individuals are often instructed to work as fast as they can because the 
examiner is timing their performance). As such, if an individual who has suffered a brain 
injury has insight into their slower processing, it is expected that they will predict lower 
performance. If the individual continues to predict average or above average skills, it may 
indicate the potential presence of ISA.
However, isolated reliance on pre-test discrepancy scores is problematic as many 
individuals, regardless of neurocognitive functioning, find it difficult to predict 
performance on a task with which they have no previous experience to anchor their 
expectations. The use of post-test discrepancy scores will help reduce this confound as the 
person will experience the task and use this experience as a concrete basis of feedback as 
to how they do and if they notice any struggles. Again, however, this alone will not allow 
for a comprehensive representation of one’s self-awareness. If the client is asked to 
evaluate their performance both before and after the task, a Metacognitive Pre-Post 
Discrepancy score allows a clinician to examine how, if at all, the client can respond to 
feedback and demonstrate the mental flexibility and openness needed to accurately 
appreciate one’s true abilities. ISA is one of the biggest detriments to successful 
rehabilitation as it is often difficult to treat symptoms that are not perceived to exist. 
Similarly, if  a client is not capable, for whatever reason, of benefiting from feedback or 
direct evidence of deficits, that will greatly hinder remediation techniques. Therefore, the 
introduction of a Metacognitive Pre-Post Discrepancy score can offer very important 
quantitative and qualitative information about an individual’s suitability for rehabilitation
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efforts, and optimally, may act as an indicator of future rehabilitation success. It can also 
be used serially which could be used as a marker of improved self-awareness and 
rehabilitation efficacy. However, it is important to note that although increased self- 
awareness of deficits carries long term benefits to an individual’s integration back into 
their life, it can have short term consequences to one’s emotional and psychological 
functioning. Whereas an individual previously oblivious to his or her own deficits does 
not experience much distress about functioning, bringing awareness to such deficits can 
have a negative impact on the client’s self-esteem, coping, and general mood. It is 
imperative that when clinicians are attempting to rehabilitate ISA, a multifaceted 
approach is used, with the inclusion of supportive individual and/or family psychotherapy 
or counselling.
Although the use of Metacognitive Discrepancy scores allow for a standardized 
assessment and identification of ISA, they, in themselves, do not act as a rehabilitation 
intervention tool. In contrast, the driving simulator is capable of doing such work and the 
results of the current study suggest that it has the potential to do so effectively. With the 
advent of more sophisticated virtual technology, current driving simulators provide a 
vastly more realistic and ecologically valid index of abilities over their predecessors (e.g., 
simple brake and gas pedal reaction time lab tests). With this improved technology, it is 
possible that higher-order driving deficits not previously detected by simplistic 
operational research measures would become more obvious with such driving simulator 
assessments. These advantages over earlier technologies may help provide stroke 
survivors, along with other neurologically impaired individuals, with concrete feedback 
and evidence about their abilities to cope with the demands of driving. At the same time,
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they remain a safer option than on-road examinations when neuropsychological measures 
suggest that cognitive functioning may be compromised.
Despite the promising results of the driving simulator use in rehabilitation and 
retraining of driving skills, it is possible that individuals will still demonstrate a great deal 
of unawareness of deficits, or denial of difficulties when it comes to their driving skills. 
Although the present study demonstrated stroke survivors’ ability to benefit from the 
feedback inherent to the simulator, the temporal stability of this benefit and adjustment 
has yet to be determined. It is possible, that over longer periods of time, once removed 
from the immediate feedback, stroke survivors would continue to show very resilient ISA 
and very little residual shift in their self-appraisals. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
Marottoli and Richardson (1998) found older drivers’ confidence and self-awareness of 
driving skill were unrelated to objective evidence of driving ability such as history of 
adverse driving events (e.g., accidents). Again, this is consistent with the seemingly 
universal phenomenon of self-enhancement bias (Delhomme, 1991), a pattern also 
observed in the current study as the majority of individuals, regardless of injury history, 
rated themselves at least average, if not above average on driving simulator performance. 
It is also consistent with the aforementioned anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974). However, as will be discussed below, the nature and resiliency of 
self-awareness of driving deficits may differ depending on whether the person is 
participating in an actual on-road test or on a less realistic driving simulator.
Limitations to the Present Study
This study was limited by several methodological issues. Although the study 
benefited from a relatively racially and demographically diverse sample, a larger clinical 
sample size is needed to replicate and generalize the current findings. The heterogeneous
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stroke group may have also limited the specificity of the findings as the study did not 
contain any consistent index of stroke severity. The small sample size did not allow for a 
separation and direct comparison of left- versus right-sided stroke to determine whether a 
consistent lateralization pattern emerged. Given the unequal representation of patients 
with left- versus right-sided strokes in this study, it is possible that the sample resulted 
from a referral bias, with left-sided stroke survivors (with significant language issues) 
presenting in a rehabilitation setting more often than right-sided stroke survivors (with 
less obvious deficits). Following stroke, there is a natural recovery slope in terms of 
cognitive and physical functioning. As such, the nature of ISA may differ over the course 
of recovery. The current study contained a very large chronicity range that, although 
lends support for the general robustness of the current findings, does not make it possible 
to delineate how time since injury may affect self-awareness of driving ability. However, 
it is worth noting that previous research has suggested that individuals who have suffered 
a stroke remain inaccurate in their assessment of the impact the stroke has had on their 
life long after the acute phase of recovery and that time since injury is not a significant 
predictor of self-awareness (Hibbard et al., 1992). Similarly, a direct comparison of stroke 
survivors who had and had not resumed driving was not completed. However, recent 
research has shown that regardless of actual driving status, stroke survivors continue to 
rate themselves as average or above average in comparison to other drivers (Scott et a l, 
2007). Finally, the current study did not include an evaluation of how emotional and 
psychological sequelae play a role in ISA. Mood issues like depression, are generally 
accepted as influencing an individual’s perception of themselves and their world.
The very recent use of more sophisticated driving simulator mechanisms has 
many advantages for future research and the ecological validity of research findings.
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However, because of the novelty of the particular driving simulator used in this study, 
large standardizations have not been conducted. This forced the use of a relatively small 
number of normal healthy controls to serve as our normative population on which T 
scores were based. Although driving simulators are a significant advance in driving 
research, even the most sophisticated virtual driving simulators cannot match the inherent 
demands of on-road evaluations. Although the driving simulator used in this study was 
used to simulate a familiar and in most instances a fairly automatized task, involvement in 
this simulation task was novel to most, if not all, of the participants. It is still possible that 
self-awareness differs depending on the familiarity of, or the importance one places on, a 
task, a hypothesis best tested using actual on-road driving situations. Stroke survivors 
may be more likely to recognize shortcomings or changes in performance when faced 
with a task that they have done for a long time and have a good baseline for comparison 
(i.e., actual on-road driving) since they cannot attribute difficulties to factors associated 
with the simulator themselves.
Directions for Future Research
This study serves as a foundation for future research examining the nature of self- 
awareness, driving after stroke, and simulator use. Previous research has been 
contradictory with regards to the hemispheric asymmetry of self-awareness deficits with 
some studies favouring a lateralization effect (Anderson & Tranel, 1989; Hartmann-Maeir 
et al., 2002; Marcel et al., 2004) whereas others do not (Hartmann-Maeir et al, 2003; 
Hibbard, Gordon, Stein, Grober, & Sliwinski, 1992). It is possible that these disparate 
findings result from divergent definitions and measurement of self-awareness, as well as 
the differing contexts or abilities that have been evaluated. Using the current 
methodology to compare left- versus right-sided strokes may help to determine if, and to
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what degree, hemispheric asymmetries exist. Similarly, further comparison of groups by 
other stroke (i.e., time post injury, severity, and presence of comorbid mood issues) and 
demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, and education level) would enlighten 
further the nature of self-awareness deficits and how they affect driving resumption. 
Previous research has been inconclusive as to how variables such as age and gender 
influence driving self-evaluations among the normal population (Finn & Bragg, 1986; 
Marcel et al., 2004). Similarly, there is a strong possibility that demographic variables, 
such as age and gender, may affect the match between user and technology. In other 
words, younger males may already be more comfortable and adept at video games and 
other similar technologies which would affect their performance on driving simulators.
It appears that self-awareness partly depends on the context or skill involved 
regardless of neurocognitive functioning. Whereas this study focused on driving 
simulator and neuropsychological performance, future research can begin to examine 
other contexts or abilities that may be differentially affected by ISA. Following stroke, 
many individuals are faced with the challenge of reintegrating into work, home, and 
community. Insight into how one is handling the demands of their job, social settings, and 
relationships, is crucial to successful return to premorbid functioning. Research 
examining survivors’ self-awareness in these areas would be very clinically relevant and 
would greatly aid rehabilitation efforts. By the same token, the current self-awareness 
paradigm could be applied to other clinical and neurological populations like traumatic 
brain injury, Alzheimer’s disease, and depression.
Although the current Metacognitive Discrepancy scores demonstrated promising 
results, future research would be useful in further determining the most effective 
presentation of this paradigm. For instance, the current study asked individuals to rate
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themselves in comparison to same-aged peers. Although this allows for the most direct 
comparison to actual performance, cognitive psychology theory suggests that it may serve 
to bias individual’s responses toward rating themselves as average. If individuals were 
asked to rate themselves in comparison to a more concrete frame of reference, such as 
their significant other, this may elicit more accurate ratings, as suggested by previous 
research (Scott et al., 2007). Also, participants were asked to make very general 
estimations based on overall performance. This requires an accurate estimation and 
integration of various aspects of any given task, a complex process perhaps too 
demanding for stroke survivors. Instead, if stroke survivors were asked to rate themselves 
on several discrete variables, they may demonstrate improved self-awareness. For 
example, instead of asking them to rate their overall driving performance, a clinician may 
ask the individual to rate how fast they were driving or how well they obeyed traffic 
signs. Finally, stroke survivors may show improved self-awareness of deficits if you ask 
them to rate themselves to how they believed they would have performed prior to their 
injury. It is possible some of the stroke survivors in this study considered themselves 
superior drivers prior to their injury and by rating themselves as average, are admitting 
some decline in performance. By asking them to use themselves as a direct frame of 
reference, clinicians may elicit a more accurate picture of ISA. Despite the over­
predictions, it would be beneficial for future research to delineate how much stroke 
survivors’ over-estimations are due to context-specific ISA or more general cognitive 
estimation deficits that hinder their ability to accurately evaluate ambiguous information.
This study was conducted within the context of a larger longitudinal investigation 
of driving resumption following stroke, including standardized on-road evaluations. The 
inclusion of on-road assessments will lead to various avenues for future research. For
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instance, similar self-awareness investigations can be conducted with on-road 
performance as this will serve as a more familiar context than the driving simulator. 
Knowing the abilities of ISA and driving simulator performance to successfully predict 
on-road performance would be important in determining rehabilitation approaches. 
Previous research has been unclear as to the utility of driving simulators to predict on­
road performance (Keller et al., 2003; Lew et al., 2005; Monga, 1997; Nouri & Tinson, 
1988; Owsley, 1997) but have been greatly limited by the primitive nature of the driving 
simulators themselves (e.g., consisting of simple green light acceleration and red light 
braking reaction time). If the newer and more sophisticated simulators prove to be 
significantly predictive of on-road success and safety, then these instruments and methods 
may begin to be used as sensitive and cost-effective screens for fitness to drive.
Finally, this study has contributed to a new line of research looking at the utility of 
driving simulators as a rehabilitation and assessment tool. It appears from this study that 
the simulator can elicit some improvement in the accuracy of self-ratings as seen by 
stronger relationships between postdicted ratings and actual performance than between 
predicted ratings and actual performance. Future research could further investigate 
whether driving simulators may be used as a method of improving self-awareness of 
deficit and serving as a retraining tool for basic driving skills as they provide immediate 
feedback to the individual in a safe yet ecologically valid setting. To do so, repeated 
administrations of simulator training sessions and accompanying pre and post self- 
evaluations would allow for an examination of learning slopes and self-evaluations with 
increased exposure to driving tasks prior to going on the road. This line of research would 
also allow the examination of the temporal stability of improved self-awareness as a
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result of simulator use. In other words, do the acute changes seen in this study translate 
into longer term improvements in self-awareness?
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study replicates the findings from previous research stating that 
stroke survivors, regardless of context, consistently demonstrate ISA. Clinically, this 
presentation clearly requires a health practitioner to avoid basing prognostic or 
rehabilitation decisions on the client’s report alone. Instead, the use of Metacognitive 
Discrepancy scores would provide valid measures of self-awareness and ability to benefit 
from feedback in neurologically impaired individuals. Finally, the results of the current 
study suggest that driving simulators allow for a safe and effective way to assess driving 
skills in individuals wishing to resume driving. Perhaps even more importantly, they can 
act as a critical intervention tool for improving driving skills themselves, as well as 
eliciting improved self-awareness of deficit. Self-awareness remains a critical moderating 
variable between neurocognitive impairment and functional outcome in the community.
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Appendix A
METACOGNITIVE RATING SCALE
INTRODUCTION OF METACOGNITIVE RATING SCALE:
We will be using this rating scale (HAND PATIENT THE RATING SCALE) for the next few tasks. I 
want to first make sure you know how to use it  I will ask you to rate how well you think you will do 
on several tasks compared to other healthy people your age. This is a scale is similar to the grading 
scale used for most classrooms, where below 50 indicates extreme difficulty performing the task 
and above 100 indicates extreme ease performing the task. For example, if you think you would 
perform like most healthy people, i.e., you will give the equivalent of a “C” performance then you 
would give me a number between 70 and 80. The lower the numbers correspond with poorer 
performance and the higher numbers correspond with better performance. So if you think you might 
have som e difficulty with the task, i.e., you think you would do worse than other healthy people your 
age, maybe a “D” performance, then you would give me a number between 60 and 70. If you think 
that you would do really well on the task compared to healthy people your age, i.e., you would do 
much better than people your age and maybe score an “A”, then you would give me a number 
between 90 and 100.
So if you thought you would perform like most other healthy people your age what number would 
you give me? _  (NUMBER SHOULD BE BETWEEN 70 - 80)
What about if you thought you would have a lot of difficulty with the task and do much worse then
others your age, what number would you give me?  (NUMBER SHOULD BE BETWEEN 50 -60)
What about if you thought you would do extremely well on the task, i.e., do extremely better than
almost everyone your age, what number would you give me?  (NUMBER SHOULD BE
BEWTWEEN 100-110)
Interviewer note: Make sure the respondent was able to use the scale before proceeding.
I I I I II I I I I


















FOLLOWING THE STANDARDIZED ADMINISTRATION OF TASK INSTRUCTIONS, THE PARTICIPANT 
RA TES HOW  WELL SHE BELIEVES SHE WILL PERFORM COMPARED TO OTHERS HER AGE.
Use the rating scale to indicate how well do you think you will perform on this task compared to 
healthy people  your age? Did you think you would score in the lower range of that category, e.g., 
like a (USE LETTER GRADE) minus, the upper range, e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE) plus, or right 
in the middle, e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE)?
THE T A S K  IS  TH EN  A D M IN ISTERED .
POST-TASK RATING
FOLLOWING THE TASK PARTICIPANTS RATE HOW WELL THEY BELIEVED THEY PERFORMED.
Use the rating scale to indicate how well you think you performed on the task compared to healthy 
people your age? Did you think you would score in the lower range of that category, e.g., like a (USE 
LETTER GRADE) minus, the upper range, e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE) plus, or right in the middle, 
e.g., like a (USE LETTER GRADE)?
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Appendix B
Conversion o f Patient Ratings to  T-Score Equivalents
Patient Rating: Extremely Worse (40 through 49) -  Moderately to Severely 
Impaired
IF RATING < 40 T-SCORE EQUIV = 29.5.
IF RATING = 40 T-SCORE EQUIV = 30.
IF RATING = 41 T-SCORE EQUIV = 30.5.
IF RATING = 42 T-SCORE EQUIV = 31.
IF RATING = 43 T-SCORE EQUIV = 31.5.
IF RATING = 44 T-SCORE EQUIV = 32.
IF RATING = 45 T-SCORE EQUIV = 32.5.
IF RATING = 46 T-SCORE EQUIV = 33.
IF RATING = 47 T-SCORE EQUIV = 33.5.
IF RATING = 48 T-SCORE EQUIV = 34.
IF RATING = 49 T-SCORE EQUIV = 34.5
Patient Rating: Much Worse 150 through 59) -  Mildly Impaired 
IF RATING = 50 T-SCORE EQUIV = 35.
IF RATING = 51 T-SCORE EQUIV = 35.5.
IF RATING = 52 T-SCORE EQUIV = 36.
IF RATING = 53 T-SCORE EQUIV = 36.5.
IF RATING = 54 T-SCORE EQUIV = 37.
IF RATING = 55 T-SCORE EQUIV = 37.5.
IF RATING = 56 T-SCORE EQUIV = 38.
IF RATING = 57 T-SCORE EQUIV = 38.5.
IF RATING = 58 T-SCORE EQUIV = 39.
IF RATING = 59 T-SCORE EQUIV = 39.5
Patient Rating: Worse (60 through 69) -  Low Average 
IF RATING = 60 T-SCORE EQUIV = 40.
IF RATING = 61 T-SCORE EQUIV = 40.5.
IF RATING = 62 T-SCORE EQUIV = 41.
IF RATING = 63 T-SCORE EQUIV = 41.5.
IF RATING = 64 T-SCORE EQUIV = 42.
IF RATING = 65 T-SCORE EQUIV = 42.5.
IF RATING = 66 T-SCORE EQUIV = 43.
IF RATING = 67 T-SCORE EQUIV = 43.5.
IF RATING = 68 T-SCORE EQUIV = 44.
IF RATING = 69 T-SCORE EQUIV = 44.5
Patient Rating: Same (70 through 791 - Average 
IF RATING = 70 T-SCORE EQUIV = 45.
IF RATING = 71 T-SCORE EQUIV = 46.
IF RATING = 72 T-SCORE EQUIV = 47.
IF RATING = 73 T-SCORE EQUIV = 48.
IF RATING = 74 T-SCORE EQUIV = 49.
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IF RATING = 75 T-SCORE EQUIV = 50.
IF RATING = 76 T-SCORE EQUIV = 51.
IF RATING = 77 T-SCORE EQUIV = 52.
IF RATING = 78 T-SCORE EQUIV = 53.
IF RATING = 79 T-SCORE EQUIV = 54.
Patient Rating: Better (80 through 89) -  Above Average 
IF RATING = 80 T-SCORE EQUIV = 55.
IF RATING = 81 T-SCORE EQUIV = 55.5.
IF RATING = 82 T-SCORE EQUIV = 56.
IF RATING = 83 T-SCORE EQUIV = 56.5.
IF RATING = 84 T-SCORE EQUIV = 57.
IF RATING = 85 T-SCORE EQUIV = 57.5.
IF RATING = 86 T-SCORE EQUIV = 58.
IF RATING = 87 T-SCORE EQUIV = 58.5.
IF RATING = 88 T-SCORE EQUIV = 59.
IF RATING = 89 T-SCORE EQUIV = 59.5
Patient Rating: Much Better (90 through 991 - Superior 
IF RATING = 90 T-SCORE EQUIV = 60.
IF RATING = 91 T-SCORE EQUIV = 60.5.
IF RATING = 92 T-SCORE EQUIV = 61.
IF RATING = 93 T-SCORE EQUIV = 61.5.
IF RATING = 94 T-SCORE EQUIV = 62.
IF RATING = 95 T-SCORE EQUIV = 62.5.
IF RATING = 96 T-SCORE EQUIV = 63.
IF RATING = 97 T-SCORE EQUIV = 63.5.
IF RATING = 98 T-SCORE EQUIV = 64.
IF RATING = 99 T-SCORE EQUIV = 64.5.
Patient Rating: Extremely Better MOO through 110) -  Very Superior 
IF RATING = 100 T-SCORE EQUIV = 65.
IF RATING = 101 T-SCORE EQUIV = 65.5.
IF RATING = 102 T-SCORE EQUIV = 66.
IF RATING = 103 T-SCORE EQUIV = 66.5.
IF RATING = 104 T-SCORE EQUIV = 67.
IF RATING = 105 T-SCORE EQUIV = 67.5.
IF RATING = 106 T-SCORE EQUIV = 68.
IF RATING = 107 T-SCORE EQUIV = 68.5.
IF RATING = 108 T-SCORE EQUIV = 69.0.
IF RATING = 109 T-SCORE EQUIV = 69.5.
IF RATING = 110 T-SCORE EQUIV = 70.
IF RATING >110 T-SCORE EQUIV = 70.5.
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Appendix C 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Principal Investigator: Lisa J. Rapport, Ph.D.
Introduction and P u rpose :
Research is being conducted at Wayne State University to examine recovery of 
independent functioning after stroke. The purpose of this study is to collect 
information about the best predictors of recovery of function and assessment of 
driving status after stroke. I am being asked to take part in this research study 
because I am an adult aged 18 years or older and I had a stroke.
Procedure:
If I take part in this study, I will be asked to answer questions about my recovery 
since my stroke. I will be asked to complete questionnaires. If I seek to resume 
driving, I may also be asked to complete a computerized driving evaluation at the 
School of Allied Health and Pharmacy. As an additional component of this study,
I realize that my medical and driving records may be obtained and only will be 
used for the purposes of this study. I understand that a significant other such as 
a family member also may be contacted to participate in the study and provide 
information about my recovery.
R isks:
There are no expected risks from participating in this study. Some people may 
experience temporary frustration from some of the testing that will be done. In 
the unlikely event of any injury resulting from this research, no reimbursement, 
compensation, or free medical treatment is offered by the Detroit Medical Center 
or Wayne State University.
Benefits:
There will be no direct benefit for me for taking part in this study. Analysis of the 
information will increase awareness of the best ways to assess driving ability and 
may help more people who have sustained strokes resume the activities they did 
before the stroke, including safe driving.
C ost of Participation:
There will be no additional cost to me or my insurance carrier for participation in 
this study.
C om pensation:
I will be paid $25 when I complete the questionnaires. If I participate in the driving 
simulator evaluation, I will be paid an additional $25.
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Voluntary Participation/W ithdrawal:
My participation is entirely voluntary. I can refuse participation at any time. 
Refusal to participate will not affect the treatment I receive now or in the future. I 
can decide to withdraw from the study at any time. My decision will not change 
the present or future health care or other services that I receive.
Confidentiality:
All information that is collected for this study will be kept entirely confidential. I 
will be identified in the research records by a code number. Information that 
identifies me personally will not be released without my written permission. Any 
presentation or publication based on the results from this study will not identify 
me by name or otherwise.
Q uestions: If I have any questions regarding this study or my participation in it, 
now or in the future, I can contact Dr. Lisa Rapport at (313) 577-2800 or Dr. 
Renee Coleman at (313) 745-9763. If I have any questions regarding my rights 
as a research subject, I can contact the Chairman of the Behavioral Investigation 
Committee at (313) 577-1628.
C onsent to  Participate in R esearch Study: I have read or had read to me all of
the above information about this research study, including the research 
procedure, possible risks, and the costs and benefits to me. The content and 
meaning of this information was explained. All of my questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent and voluntarily offer to follow the 
study requirements and take part in this study. I will receive a signed copy of this 
consent form.
Signature of Study Subject Date
Printed Name of Study Subject/Patient Date
Signature of Legally Authorized Representative Date
Relationship to Subject
Signature of Witness Date
Signature of Investigator/Designee Obtaining Informed Consent Date
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Appendix D
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR CAREGIVER/SIGNIFICANT OTHER 
Principal Investigator: Lisa J. Rapport, Ph.D.
Introduction and P u rpose :
Research is being conducted at Wayne State University to examine recovery of 
independent functioning after stroke. The purpose of this study is to collect 
information about the best predictors of recovery of function and assessment of 
driving status after stroke. I am being asked to take part in this research study 
because I am an adult aged 18 years or older and my significant other had a 
stroke.
Procedure:
If I take part in this study, I will be asked to answer questions about my significant 
other’s recovery since his or her stroke. I will be asked to complete 
questionnaires about myself and my significant other. I may also be asked to 
complete some paper and pencil tasks and a computerized driving evaluation at 
the School of Allied Health and Pharmacy. I am aware that the researchers may 
be interviewing my significant other.
R isks:
There are no expected risks from participating in this study.
Benefits:
There will be no direct benefit for me for taking part in this study. However, the 
information may help more people who have sustained strokes resume the 
activities they did before the stroke, including safe driving.
C ost of Participation:
There will be no additional cost to me or my insurance carrier for participation in 
this study.
Com pensation:
I will be paid $25 when I complete the questionnaires. If I participate in the driving 
simulator evaluation, I will be paid an additional $25. In the unlikely event of any 
injury resulting from this research, no reimbursement, compensation, or free 
medical treatment is offered by the Detroit Medical Center or Wayne State 
University.
Voluntary Participation/W ithdrawal:
Taking part in this study is voluntary. I may choose not to take part in this study, 
or if I decide to take part, I can later change my mind and withdraw from the 
study. My decision will not change the present or future health care or other 
services that I receive.
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Confidentiality:
All information that is collected for this study will be kept entirely confidential. I 
will be identified in the research records by a code number. Information that 
identifies me personally will not be released without my written permission. Any 
presentation or publication based on the results from this study will not identify 
me by name or otherwise.
Q uestions: If I have any questions regarding this study or my participation in it, 
now or in the future, I can contact Dr. Lisa Rapport at (313) 577-2800 or Dr.
Renee Coleman at (313) 745-9763. If I have any questions regarding my rights 
as a research subject, I can contact the Chair of the Behavioral Investigation 
Committee at (313) 577-1628.
C onsen t to  Participate in R esearch Study: I have read or had read to me all of
the above information about this research study, including the research 
procedure, possible risks, and the costs and benefits to me. The content and 
meaning of this information was explained. All of my questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction. I hereby consent and voluntarily offer to follow the 
study requirements and take part in this study. I will receive a signed copy of this 
consent form.
Signature of Study Subject Date
Printed Name of Study Subject/Patient Date
Signature of Legally Authorized Representative Date
Relationship to Subject
Signature of Witness Date
Signature of Investigator/Designee Obtaining Informed Consent Date
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